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R E S U M E N
Esta tesis se centra en la aplicación de modelos de búsqueda y “mismatch” para
analizar los determinantes del desempleo y de la inversión en capital humano. El
primer capítulo estudia el efecto de la proporción de viviendas en propiedad sobre
el desempleo. El segundo capítulo estudia como la participación de la mujer en el
mercado de trabajo ha afectado ciertos agregados de la economía. El tercer capítulo
analiza a nivel teórico el rol del tamaño del mercado en generar incentivos para invertir
en capital humano.
El primer capítulo, titulado “Housing tenure and the labour market”, estudia el
efecto de la proporción de viviendas en propiedad sobre la migración y el desempleo
en una economía poblada de parejas. Con este objetivo, he desarrollado un modelo de
búsqueda conjunta con múltiples localizaciones donde las parejas deciden comprar o
alquilar su vivienda. La calibración del modelo se ha realizado para Estados Unidos.
Obtengo que los que tienen su vivienda en propiedad tienen una tasa de desempleo
menor que los que alquilan a pesar de que permanecen desempleados más tiempo.
Este resultado es debido a las diferencias en las tasas de transición al desempleo entre
propietarios e inquilinos y la endogeneidad de la decisión de ser propietario. En un
modelo de búsqueda conjunta, la mayor tasa de migración de los inquilinos implica
que pueden dejar su empleo, y ser desempleados, más a menudo.
El segundo capítulo, “The effect of women participation rate on the labour market”,
estudia el effect de la incorporación de la mujer en el mercado de trabajo sobre el
desempleo, la migración y el ahorro. Desarrollo un modelo con múltiples localizaciones
donde las parejas buscan empleo, y deciden su localización y sus ahorros. Obtengo
que la participación de la mujer en el mercado de trabajo incrementa la migración por
motivos laborales y la tasa de desempleo masculina. Por otro lado, también encuentro
una reducción sustancial del nivel de ahorro.
El tercer capítulo, “Human capital and market size”, estudia como el tamaño del
mercado de trabajo afecta la decisión de los trabajadores de invertir en capital humano.
Considero un mercado de trabajo donde las empresas I consider a labour market
where firms jerarquizan los trabajadores según su nivel de habilidades. El proceso
de emparejamiento que opera en el mercado tiene la propiedad que la probabilidad
de encontrar empleo de los trabajadores depende del tamaño del mercado, “market
tightness” y su “ranking”. Cuando la “market tightness” es alta, los mercados grandes
dan más incentivos para adquirir capital humano y la distribución de habilidades
converge al nivel máximo. Sin embargo, si el nivel de “market tightness” es bajo, los
incentivos para invertir de los trabajadores con menor nivel disminuye con el tamaño
del mercado, lo que implica una distribución de habilidades más desigual en los
mercados grandes.
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A B S T R A C T
This thesis focuses on the application of models of search and mismatch to analyse
the determinants of unemployment and human capital investment. The first chapter
studies the effect of home-ownership on unemployment. The second chapter studies
how women participation in the labour market has affected several aggregates of the
economy. The third chapter analyses at a theoretical level the role of the size of the
labour market in generating incentives to invest in human capital.
The first chapter, entitled “Housing tenure and the labour market”, studies the effect
of home-ownership on migration and unemployment in an economy populated by
couples. To this end, a model of joint search with multiple locations and housing tenure
decisions is developed and calibrated to the U.S. economy. I find that home-owners have
a lower unemployment rate than renters although they suffer longer unemployment
spells. This can be explained by the differences in the separation rate of jobs between
owners and renters and the endogeneity of housing tenure. With joint search, the higher
migration rate of renters implies that they quit their jobs, and become unemployed,
more often.
The second chapter, “The effect of women participation rate on the labour market”,
studies the effect of women participation in the labour force on unemployment, mi-
gration and savings. I develop a model with multiple locations where couples search
for jobs, and make saving and locational decisions. I find that women participation
into the labour market increases work related migration and the unemployment rate of
men. On the other hand, I also find a substantial decrease in the level of savings.
The third chapter, “Human capital and market size”, studies how the size of the
labour market affects workers’ decision to invest in human capital. I consider a labour
market where firms rank workers according to their level of skills. The matching
process operating in the market has the property that the job finding probability of the
workers depends on market size, market tightness and their ranking. When market
tightness is high, bigger markets provide more incentives to acquire human capital and
the distribution of skills converges to the highest level. However, if the level of market
tightness is low, the incentives to invest for the workers with lower rank decrease with
the size of the market, which results in a more unequal distribution of skills in bigger
markets.
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1
H O U S I N G T E N U R E A N D T H E L A B O U R M A R K E T
1.1 introduction
Home-owners are less mobile than renters. In the US, 7.4% of renters migrate each year
compared to only 1.7% of home-owners1. Being a home-owner makes migration more
costly, since selling and buying a house entails some costs that renters do not need
to pay. These transaction costs also reduce the incentives to migrate for job reasons.
Unemployed homeowners are less willing to take jobs out of their city and remain
unemployed for a longer time. At the aggregate level, this argument implies that
economies with a high home-ownership rate will have a low level of migration and the
labour market will be less efficient at matching workers and firms.
In this paper, we study the effects of housing tenure on mobility and unemployment.
Our contribution is to consider that households consist of more than one individual.
We will assume that households are composed of two members, husband and wife,
that both of them belong to the labour force and make their decisions jointly. In the
US, there are more couples with both spouses employed than with only one spouse
employed.2 The model economy consists of a large number of couples that can choose
either to own or rent their house and that can work in different locations. In each
location, there is a frictional labour market where firms and workers meet. If a firm
and a worker match, wages are bargained. Job creation is determined by free entry of
firms.
In a calibrated version of our model to the US economy, we find that home-owners
have a lower unemployment rate than renters despite having longer unemployment
spells. This is the result of two effects. First, renters have a higher separation rate from
their jobs than home-owners. Second, unemployed home-owners that are liquidity
constrained sell their house and become renters.
To understand the first effect, we need to take into account the interaction between
the spouses. Suppose that an unemployed worker, the husband, receives a job offer
from another city. If the couple decides that he should accept the job, the two spouses
will migrate. However, it is likely that the wife was employed in their former city, so
she will have to quit her job and move with her husband. This implies that she will be
unemployed for a while until she also finds a job in the new city. Note, that the couple
is better off migrating although the wife has to quit her job. Thus, the couples that
are more likely to migrate, become unemployed at a higher rate. We can now include
housing tenure into the argument and conclude that if owners migrate less, they will
also lose their job at a lower rate than renters.
1 Inter-county migration rates from CPS 2011. The same pattern occurs for any year although the migration
rate of both renters and owners have been declining over time.
2 In 2012, 58% of all married-couple families with at least one member employed were families with both
spouses employed. 28% were families with only one spouse employed (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
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The results of the model are consistent with the work by Coulson and Fisher (2009)
that estimate a negative effect of home-ownership on the probability of being unem-
ployed.
Given that housing tenure has implications on the labour outcomes of owners versus
renters, we use our model to conduct the following policy exercise. We introduce a
tax policy that favours home-ownership. Under this policy the returns from financial
assets are taxed but owners imputed rents are not, which makes more profitable to
keep wealth by owning a house than accumulating financial assets. The decision to buy
or sell a house, thus, involves a trade-off between benefiting from the preferential tax
treatment and avoiding the transaction costs. We compare this benchmark economy
with an alternative economy with a positive tax on home-owners imputed rents. In this
alternative economy there are less incentives to own a house and the home-ownership
rate is lower. We calculate the results for an economy with a tax system such that the
home-ownership rate is 10 percentage points lower than in the benchmark economy.
We find that the effect on migration is important, as it rises by 8%. The change on taxes
affects the unemployment rate through different channels. First, for a given level of
market tightness, the matching process becomes more efficient because there are fewer
workers who reject job offers. Second, the separation rate increases because there are
more quits. And third, there is more entry of firms, that is, market tightness is higher.
The net effect is a small decrease of unemployment of 0.1%. Therefore, we find a small
positive relationship between the home-ownership rate and unemployment.
Related literature
The results of this paper contribute to the literature that estimates the effect of
home-ownership on unemployment. Since Oswald (1997) suggested that a high home-
ownership rate could be the cause behind the high unemployment rate in Europe,
several authors have estimated the effect of housing tenure both at the regional level
and at the individual level.
There is plenty of evidence that home-ownership has a negative effect on mobility, see
for example Winkler (2010), Barceló (2006) and Caldera and Andrews (2011). However,
the empirical results on unemployment duration are mixed. Taskin and Yaman (2012)
for the US and Brunet and Lesueur (2003) for France estimate a positive effect of
home-ownership on unemployment duration but Munch et al. (2006), van Vuuren
and van Leuvensteijn (2007), Battu, Ma and Phimister (2008) and Flatau et al. (2003)
find a negative effect of home-ownership on unemployment duration for Denmark,
Netherlands, UK and Australia. As Flatau et al. (2003) show, liquidity constraints are
an important determinant of the differences in unemployment between owners and
renters. In the Australian case, they find that the shorter unemployment duration of
owners is driven by the owners with a mortgage. However, the model we develop
abstracts from this potential mechanism. We will only deal with the effect of transaction
costs.
At the aggregate level, Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) report for the US a positive
relationship between home-ownership and unemployment. Their work highlights the
need of studying the effect of home-ownership on unemployment.
With respect to the theoretical models that relate home-owners’ moving costs to
unemployment, our model is closest to Coulson and Fisher (2009) and Head and Lloyd
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(2012). As in Coulson and Fisher (2009), we model the labour market as a frictional
market with endogenous job creation and wages. Coulson and Fisher (2009) find that a
higher home-ownership rate may foster firm entry so that aggregate unemployment
decreases. On the other hand, Head and Lloyd (2012) explicitly model the transaction
frictions of the housing market and the tenure decision of households. They quantify
that the effect of home-ownership on unemployment is positive but small, a decrease
of 10pp of owner occupied housing decreases unemployment by 0.3pp. Our model
relates to their work in the sense that we also allow households to decide whether to
own or rent their house.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on joint search. In this literature,
Guler et al. (2012) highlight that when individuals make job decisions jointly, their
locational decisions are restricted, with a negative effect on unemployment. Gemici
(2011) estimates the implications of joint search on wages and employment. Particularly
interesting for the topic addressed here is the exercise about the effect of moving costs
on labour market outcomes. Gemici (2011) finds that when moving costs are higher,
the decrease in the migration rate has no effect on the husbands employment rate but
has a positive effect on the wives employment rate. This result is consistent with our
finding that the households who have the higher costs of moving also have a lower
unemployment rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy.
Section 3 analyses theoretically the unemployment rate by housing tenure. Section 4
covers the calibration. In section 5 we use the model to analyse the relationship between
housing tenure and the labour market. Section 6 repeats the analysis for single-agent
households and, finally, Section 7 concludes.
1.2 model economy
1.2.1 Setting
Time is discrete. There are two locations, l and n. The economy is populated by a
measure 1 of infinitely lived individuals. There is also a continuum of firms. All
individuals are married. A couple (or household) consists of two individuals who
share their income, house and wealth. They are restricted to live and work in the same
location and they must either rent or own a house. Each individual derives utility from
a private composite consumption good, c. Individuals are risk averse.
Each firm operates a technology such that, if the firm is matched with a worker,
it turns one unit of labour into y units of consumption good. Output can become
costlessly consumption good and housing. Thus, the price of housing is the same as
the price of the consumption good, which is normalised to one.
1.2.2 Households: housing and financial assets
All houses have the same size h. Households can save and borrow at a constant interest
rate i. We will denote their level of savings by a. However, there is a borrowing limit
that depends on whether the household rents or owns a house. Renters can only save,
a ≥ 0, whereas owners may borrow up to some proportion of the value of the house,
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a ≥ − (1− χ) h. Therefore, χ denotes the minimum down-payment required in order
to buy a house. Let A =
[
− (1− χ) h , a
]
be the set of possible assets. Finally, owners
also incur a transaction cost when buying a house and when selling it, which is φbh
and φsh. The price of renting a house is r f . All the houses depreciate at rate δh each
period. Home-owners pay for the amount depreciated each period.
1.2.3 Households: labour
Each member of the couple can be either employed or unemployed. Unemployed
workers receive flow income z and look for a job in both locations. Let uk and vk be
the number of unemployed workers in location k with k ∈ {l, n}. In each location
vacancies and job seekers meet randomly each period according to an aggregate
meeting function with constant returns to scale. In order to account for the possibility
that the unemployed search more efficiently locally, we will assume that u−k enters into
the meeting function of location k as εu−k and that ε < 1. Thus, each period the number
of meetings in location k will be given by M(uk + εu−k, vk). With these assumptions,
an unemployed worker in l will meet a vacant job in this location with probability
αll =
M(ul+εun,vl)
ul+εun
. On the other hand, an unemployed worker in location n will meet a
vacant job in l with probability αnl = εαll . We define θl =
vl
ul+εun
as the market tightness
in l. Similarly for location n. An unemployed worker may meet one, two or zero vacant
jobs. After meeting them, the couple decides whether to match to one of them or to
remain unemployed. If the match is realized, wages are set by Nash bargaining over
fixed-wage contracts. That is, once the wage is bargained in the first period, the worker
will receive the same wage until the end of the employment relationship. Denote by
P = [z, y] the set of possible wages.
Employed workers cannot search. The employment relationship may end exoge-
nously with probability s in each period. A match may also end if a worker quits. We
only allow workers to quit if their spouse receives a job offer from the other location
and they decide to accept it and migrate.
1.2.4 Taxes
In this paper we will analyse how the home-ownership rate affects the labour market.
We will do that by comparing two economies whose differences in the home-ownership
rate will arise from different tax codes. The tax code in the model includes a tax on
financial income and labour income, τ, and a tax on imputed rents, τir. Imputed rents
are the rents provided by owner-occupied housing. Therefore, the higher the tax on
imputed rents, the lower the return on owning a house, which implies that households
will be less willing to own.
1.2.5 Timing of events
Each period is composed of the following stages:
1. Unemployed workers and vacant jobs meet in the labour market.
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2. Couples where at least one spouse is unemployed choose a job for the unemployed
spouse and bargaining for new matches takes place.
3. The spouses of the unemployed workers that have accepted a job in another city
quit and they both migrate.
4. Production takes place, couples receive their income and decide their level of
consumption, financial assets, and their housing tenure for that period.
5. Employed workers lose their job with probability s.
1.2.6 Household’s decision problem
We describe next the Bellman equations of the couples at the point in which they have
already bargained over the wage and the migration decision has already taken place.
In stage 4, W
(
h, g, a, pm, p f
)
is the value of a couple that in the previous period had
housing tenure h and that in this period has migration status g, level of assets a, whose
husband has labour payoff pm and whose wife has labour payoff p f . Housing tenure
can be either h = h if the couple owned the house in the previous period and h = 0 if
they were renters. The migration status will be g = 0 if the couple has not migrated
and g = 1 if it has migrated in stage 3. Finally, pm is the wage of the husband if he is
employed and is equal to z if the husband is unemployed. Similarly for the wife. To
simplify notation, we omit the location from the state of the couple.
The problem of the household in stage 4 is the following:
W
(
h, g, a, pm, p f
)
= max
cm ,c f ,a′ ,h′∈{0,h}
{
ϑu (cm) + (1− ϑ) u
(
c f
)
+ βW˜
(
h′, a′, pm, p f
)}
(1)
st cm + c f + a′ + r f h + (φb + 1) h′ Ih=0 = inc +
(
r f − δh
)
(1− τir) h′ + (1− φs) hIh′=0 if g=0 (1a)
cm + c f + a′ + r f h + (φb + 1) h′ = inc +
(
r f − δh
)
(1− τir) h′ + (1− φs) h if g=1 (1b)
a′ ≥ − (1− χ) h′ (1c)
with inc =
(
1− τ Ipm 6=z
)
pm +
(
1− τ Ip f 6=z
)
p f + (1+ i (1− τ)) a.
The couple chooses consumption, cm and c f , the level of financial assets they want to
keep, a′, and the current housing tenure, h′, that maximizes its lifetime utility subject
to the budget constraint. Their lifetime utility is the sum of their current utility plus a
continuation value, W˜
(
h′, a′, pm, p f
)
. We will describe the budget constraint first.
First of all, notice that the budget constraint depends on the migration status of the
couple. The first restriction corresponds to the budget constraint in the case that the
couple has remained in its location, g = 0, and the second restriction corresponds to
the budget constraint in the case that the couple has migrated at the beginning of the
period, g = 1.
We examine first the case of no migration. The left hand side of constraint (1a)
includes the couple’s consumption expenditure, cm + c f , the level of savings that they
want to keep, a′, and the rent of the house, r f h. The last term, (φb + 1) h′ Ih=0, is what
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the couple has to pay if they want to buy a house3, where Ih=0 is an indicator function
equal to one when h = 0 and equal to zero otherwise. We now turn to the right hand
side of the constraint. The first term, inc, includes the labour income net of taxes,(
1− τ Ipm 6=z
)
pm +
(
1− τ Ip f 6=z
)
p f , their financial assets and their income from these
assets net of taxes, (1+ i (1− τ)) a. The second term, (r f − δh) (1− τir) h′, accounts
for the imputed rents and the depreciation and is positive when the couple is owner.
The government tax on these rents is τir. Finally, if the couple is owner and sells their
house, they will receive (1− φs) hIh′=0, where Ih′=0 is an indicator function equal to
one when h′ = 0 and equal to zero otherwise.
Consider now the budget constraint of a couple that has moved at the beginning of
the period, g = 1, described in equation (1b). The difference with the previous case is
that the owners who migrate necessarily sell their house and pay for the corresponding
transaction costs. Consequently, if they want to be owners again, they must also buy a
house.
The last restriction, (1c), tells us that only owners can be indebted up to (1− χ) h.
After reviewing the constraints of the household we can deal with the lifetime
utility of the couple. The current utility is the sum of the utility of both spouses
with Pareto weights given by ϑ and (1− ϑ). With respect to the continuation value,
W˜
(
h′, a′, pm, p f
)
, notice that it does not depend on the migration status, migration only
affects the budget constraint. However, the continuation value differs depending on the
employment status of the couple,
(
pm, p f
)
. We will explain first the case of a couple
where both husband and wife are employed, then the case where only one of them is
employed and last we will describe the continuation value when both are unemployed.
1.2.6.1 Husband and wife employed
If both members of the couple are employed, we will have that pm = wm and p f = w f .
Then, their continuation value is:
W˜
(
h, a, wm, w f
)
= (1− s)2 W
(
h, 0, a, wm, w f
)
+ (1− s) sW (h, 0, a, wm, z)
+s (1− s)W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f
)
+ s2W (h, 0, a, z, z)
That is, in the next period, they both will keep their job with probability (1− s)2,
they both will lose their job with probability s2and with probability s (1− s), only the
husband will keep his job and with the same probability only the wife will keep her job.
In neither of the cases the couple migrates, since only unemployed workers who have
found a job in another location and their spouses can migrate. Finally, since wages are
constant during the employment relationship, next period the workers that keep their
job receive the same labour payoff as in the current period.
1.2.6.2 One spouse employed
If only the husband is employed4, the continuation value, W˜ (h, a, wm, z), will be the
expectation over two outcomes: the value of the couple at the beginning of the period
3 In the case that a couple chooses to be owner this period and they were renters the previous one.
4 The value of a couple where only the wife is employed works analogously.
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if he keeps his job and the value if he loses it. We denote by W˜−s (h, a, wm, z) the first
case and W˜s (h, a, z, z) the second one. Therefore, the continuation value is:
W˜ (h, a, wm, z) = (1− s) W˜−s (h, a, wm, z) + sW˜s (h, a, z, z)
We describe next how W˜−s (h, a, wm, z) is calculated. This value is the expectation
over the outcomes represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Employment decision when the husband keeps his job
Since in the previous period the wife was unemployed, at the beginning of this one,
she may meet a vacancy from the location where they live, “inside vacancy”, from the
other location, “outside vacancy”, both or none. We had defined the probability of
meeting an inside vacancy as αll when the worker lives in l and αnn when the worker
lives in n. Since we are abstracting away from location, let the probability of meeting
an inside vacancy be denoted as αi. Similarly, we will denote the probability of meeting
an outside vacancy, which can be αln for a worker who lives in l and αnl for a worker
who lives in n, as αo.
W˜−s (h, a, wm, z) can be calculated as the sum of four terms which correspond to the
four possible outcomes. The first term corresponds to the case when she does not meet
any vacancy, the second, when she only meets an outside vacancy, the third, meeting
an inside vacancy and the last corresponds to the case when she meets both:
W˜−s (h, a, wm, z) = (1− αi) (1− αo)W (h, 0, a, wm, z)
+ (1− αi) αo max
{
W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f (h, 1, a, wm)
)
, W (h, 0, a, wm, z)
}
+αi (1− αo)max
{
W
(
h, 0, a, wm, w f (h, 0, a, wm)
)
, W (h, 0, a, wm, z)
}
+αiαomax
{
W
(
h, 0, a, wm, w f (h, 0, a, wm)
)
, W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f (h, 1, a, wm)
)
, W (h, 0, a, wm, z)
}
Depending on which vacancies the wife meets, the couple must decide if she matches
to some vacancy and if the husband must quit his job. As a result, they will be in
one of the three cases represented in the third column of Figure 1. These cases are
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that the couple remains in the same employment status with the husband employed
and the wife unemployed, that the wife gets employed in the same location so they
both are employed or that the wife gets employed in the other location and they both
migrate. In the last two cases the continuation value of the couple will depend on the
wage that the wife will earn in her new job. We will derive how the wage is bargained
in subsection 1.2.8, now we just take into account that the wage will depend on the
previous period tenure status of the couple, h, their migration status, g, their level
of assets, a, and both the employment status and wage of her husband, that we will
summarise as wm, so w f = w f (h, g, a, wm). We can now describe the continuation value
of the couple.
If the wife does not meet any vacancy, the couple has no choice and must remain in
the same employment status as before. The value of the couple will be W (h, 0, a, wm, z).
If the wife only meets an outside vacancy, she can accept it or reject it. If she rejects
it, they will remain in the same employment status and have value W (h, 0, a, wm, z).
But if she accepts it, the husband must quit and they both migrate. Then, their
value will be W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f (h, 1, a, wm)
)
. Consider now the case where the wife only
meets an inside vacancy. If she accepts, in the following period they will be both
employed, with value W
(
h, 0, a, wm, w f (h, 0, a, wm)
)
, and if she rejects they will remain
with the same employment status as before W (h, 0, a, wm, z). Finally, if the wife meets
both vacancies, she can either match the inside vacancy, match the outside vacancy
or reject both. The value of the couple in each of these cases will be, respectively,
W
(
h, 0, a, wm, w f (h, 0, a, wm)
)
, W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f (h, 1, a, wm)
)
and W (h, 0, a, wm, z).
Let’s consider now W˜s (h, a, z, z), which is the value of the couple if the husband lost
his job at the end of the previous period. Again, we must take into account that the
wife may meet and outside vacancy, an inside vacancy, both or none. As the husband
has lost his job, his employment status in the wage function of the wife will be denoted
by, 1, so w f = w f (h, g, a, 1). In Figure 2 are summarized the decisions of the couple for
each of these cases.
Figure 2: Employment decision when the husband loses his job
Therefore, the value of the couple at the beginning of the period is:
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W˜s (h, a, z, z) = (1− αi) (1− αo)W (h, 0, a, z, z)
+ (1− αi) αo max
{
W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f (h, 1, a, 1)
)
, W (h, 0, a, z, z)
}
+αi (1− αo)max
{
W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f (h, 0, a, 1)
)
, W (h, 0, a, z, z)
}
+αiαomax
{
W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f (h, 0, a, 1)
)
, W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f (h, 1, a, 1)
)
, W (h, 0, a, z, z)
}
If the wife does not meet any vacancy, both the husband and the wife are unemployed
in the following period and their value will be W (h, 0, a, z, z). If the wife only meets
an outside vacancy, she can accept it or reject it. If she rejects it, they will be both
unemployed and have value W (h, 0, a, z, z). But if she accepts, they migrate and obtain
the value W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f (h, 1, a, 1)
)
. The third case is that the wife only meets an inside
vacancy. If she accepts, they will have value W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f (h, 0, a, 1)
)
, and if she
rejects they will obtain W (h, 0, a, z, z). Finally, if the wife meets both vacancies, she can
either match the inside vacancy, match the outside vacancy or reject both. The value
of the couple in each of these cases will be, respectively, W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f (h, 0, a, 1)
)
,
W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f (h, 1, a, 1)
)
and W (h, 0, a, z, z).
1.2.6.3 Neither member of the couple is employed
If both members of the couple are unemployed, their value will be given by W (h, 0, a, z, z).
In this case, they both will search and in the following period, they can meet vacan-
cies from both locations. We relegate the description of the possible outcomes to the
Appendix.
1.2.6.4 Policy functions
From the household’s problem we obtain several policy functions. Let ψ be the state
of the household, that is, ψ =
(
h, g, a, pm, p f
)
. The savings rule will be given by
a∗ = ga (ψ) and the tenure policy will be given by h∗ = gh (ψ).
1.2.7 Firms problem
We now turn to the problem of the firm. There are many firms, each with one job.
Each of them produces y units of consumption good each period when the job is filled.
The per period profits of the firm are constant for the duration of the match, given
that the wage is constant. However, the probability that the match ends depends on
the state of the couple because so does the probability that a worker quits. Thus, we
will describe first the value of a filled job that employs a worker whose spouse is also
employed. Then, we will describe the case where the spouse is unemployed. Note also
that the profits of the firm not only depend on the state of the couple but also on which
member of the couple it is employing.
1.2.7.1 Both members of the couple are employed
The value of a firm that employs the husband when the couple is in state ψ =(
h, g, a, wm, w f
)
is J (m,ψ) = J
(
m, h, g, a, wm, w f
)
with:
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J
(
m, h, g, a, wm, w f
)
= y− wm + 11+ i
[
(1− s)2 J
(
m, h∗, 0, a∗, wm, w f
)
+ s (1− s) J (m, h∗, 0, a∗, wm, z) + sV] (2)
where h∗ = gh (ψ)and a∗ = ga (ψ).
In that period the firm will obtain the productivity minus the wage. In the
following period, with probability (1− s) the match will continue and with prob-
ability s the match will end, in this latter case the value of the firm will be V.
However, if the match continues, either the wife keeps her job and the value of
the firm is J
(
m, h∗, 0, a∗, wm, w f
)
or she loses her job and the value of the firm is
J (m, h∗, 0, a∗, wm, z).
1.2.7.2 Only one member of the couple is employed
The value of a firm that employs the husband when the couple is in state ψ =
(h, g, a, wm, z) is denoted by J (m,ψ) = J (m, h, g, a, wm, z). It consists of current profits,
y − wm, plus a continuation value that depends on the employment status of both
spouses. If the husband loses his job, that is, if the match ends for exogenous reasons,
the continuation value of the firm is V. If the match does not end for exogenous reasons
we must take into account the value of the firm when the wife becomes employed
in the same location, when she becomes employed in the other location or when she
remains unemployed.
In the first case, the case in which the wife finds a job in the same location, the
continuation value of the firm will be the value of employing the husband when
both spouses are employed, J
(
m, h∗, 0, a∗, wm, w f (h∗, 0, a∗, wm)
)
. The probability of this
event, that we denote by p2, is the sum of two terms. The first one is the probability
that the wife meets an inside and an outside vacancy, αiαo, and matches the inside
vacancy. We must take into account that acceptance will take place if the couple is not
worse off than when they migrate W
(
h∗, 0, a∗, wm, w f (·)
)
≥W
(
h∗, 1, a∗, z, w f (·)
)
or than
when the wife remains unemployed, W
(
h∗, 0, a∗, wm, w f (·)
)
≥ W (h∗, 0, a∗, wm, z). The
second term is the probability that the wife only meets an inside vacancy, αi (1− αo),
and accepts. In this case acceptance will take place if the couple is not worse off than
when the wife remains unemployed, W
(
h∗, 0, a∗, wm, w f (·)
)
≥ W (h∗, 0, a∗, wm, z). Thus,
p2 can be calculated as:
p2 =
[
αiαo I
(
W(h∗ ,0,a∗ ,wm ,w f ( ))≥W(h∗ ,1,a∗ ,z,w f ( ))
)
+ αi (1− αo)
]
I
(
W(h∗ ,0,a∗ ,wm ,w f ( ))≥W(h∗ ,0,a∗ ,wm ,z)
)
If the wife becomes employed in the other location, the husband will quit his
job and migrate with her, so the continuation value for the firm will be V. The
probability of this event is denoted by p1. It is also the sum of two terms. The
first one is the probability that the wife meets an inside and an outside vacancy,
αiαo, and matches the outside vacancy. We must take into account that acceptance
will take place if the couple is better off than when she matches the inside vacancy
W
(
h∗, 1, a∗, z, w f (·)
)
> W
(
h∗, 0, a∗, wm, w f (·)
)
or than when the wife remains unem-
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ployed, W
(
h∗, 1, a∗, z, w f (·)
)
> W (h∗, 0, a∗, wm, z). The second term is the probability
that the wife only meets an outside vacancy, (1− αi) αo, and accepts. In this case accep-
tance will take place if the couple is better off than when the wife remains unemployed,
W
(
h∗, 1, a∗, z, w f (·)
)
> W (h∗, 0, a∗, wm, z). Thus, p1 can be calculated as:
p1 =
[
αiαo I
(
W(h∗ ,1,a∗ ,z,w f ( ))>W(h∗ ,0,a∗ ,wm ,w f ( ))
)
+ (1− αi) αo
]
I
(
W(h∗ ,1,a∗ ,z,w f ( ))>W(h∗ ,0,a∗ ,wm ,z)
)
If the wife remains unemployed, the continuation value of the firm will be the value
of employing the husband when the wife is unemployed, J (m, h∗, 0, a∗, wm, z). This
will occur with probability 1− p2 − p1.
Therefore, the value of a firm that employs the husband when the wife is unemployed
is given by:
J (m, h, g, a, wm, z) = y− wm + 11+ i
[
(1− s) p2 J
(
m, h∗, 0, a∗, wm, w f (h∗, 0, a∗, wm)
)
+ (1− s) (1− p2 − p1) J (m, h∗, 0, a∗, wm, z) + (s + (1− s) p1)V] (3)
1.2.7.3 Value of a vacancy
To create a job, a firm first posts a vacancy. There is a flow cost of posting a vacancy,
denoted by ξ. In the following period, the firm will hire a worker with probability
αr. Let λhire
(
j, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
be the density of the unemployed workers that a firm can
hire where j identifies the spouse in the couple j ∈ {m, f }. To simplify notation we
denote ψ˜ =
(
j, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
, so the density can be written as λhire
(
j, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
=
λhire
(
ψ˜
)
.5 Notice that the value of a filled job is a function of ψ˜, J
(
ψ˜
)
. The value of a
vacancy is:
V = −ξ + αr
1+ i
∫
Ψ
J
(
ψ˜
)
λhire
(
ψ˜
)
dψ˜ (4)
with Ψ = {m, f } x
{
0, h
}
x {0, 1} xAxPxP.
1.2.8 Wage determination
The wage is fixed for the duration of the match and determined through Nash bargain-
ing between the firm and the worker at the beginning of their employment relationship.
We will describe here the wage determination of the husband. The same logic applies
for the wife. The wage of the husband will depend on the previous period tenure status
of the couple, h, their migration status, g, their level of assets, a, and the employment
status of the wife. The employment status of the wife in the wage function includes
more possibilities than her employment status in the value of the couple. For the case
of the wage function, we must consider the case in which the wife is employed at the
moment of bargaining, the case in which she is unemployment but is also being hired
that period and the case in which she is unemployed and remains unemployed that
5 λhire
(
ψ˜
)
and αr are derived in the Appendix.
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period. In the first case, the employment status of the wife will be given by w f , so the
wage of the husband will be wm
(
h, g, a, w f
)
. In the second case, the case in which the
wife is also being hired, the employment status of the wife will be denoted by 2 and
the wage of the husband will be wm (h, g, a, 2). Finally, if the wife remains unemployed,
her employment status will be denoted by 1 and the wage of the husband will be
wm (h, g, a, 1).
Consider a couple with a level of assets a, and that in the previous period had tenure
h. If the wife is unemployed at the beginning of the period and does not get a job, the
wage of the husband, wm (h, g, a, 1), will be the solution to:
max
wm
(W (h, g, a, wm, z)−W (h, 0, a, z, z))γ (J (m, h, g, a, wm, z)−V)1−γ (5)
The first term, W (h, g, a, wm, z)−W (h, 0, a, z, z), represents the gains from the match
for the couple if the husband gets employed at wage wm where W (h, g, a, wm, z) is the
value of the couple if he gets matched and W (h, 0, a, z, z) is the value if he remains
unemployed. If the job is in the other location, they will migrate and g = 1, whereas if
the job is in their location they will not migrate. The second term, J (m, h, g, a, wm, z)−V,
represents the gains from the match for the firm.
If the wife is unemployed at the beginning of the period and both the husband and
the wife find a job at the same time6, the wage of the husband, wm (h, g, a, 2), will be
the solution to:
max
wm
(
W
(
h, g, a, wm, w f (h, g, a, 2)
)−W (h, g, a, z, w f (h, g, a, 2)))γ·
·
(
J
(
m, h, g, a, wm, w f (h, g, a, 2)
)−V)1−γ (6)
In this case, the value of the couple if he gets matched will be the value of being
both spouses employed, W
(
h, g, a, wm, w f (h, g, a, 2)
)
, and the value of the couple if he
does not get matched is the value of the couple when only the wife gets employed
W
(
h, g, a, z, w f (h, g, a, 2)
)
. Consistent with this, the gains from the match for the firm
are J
(
m, h, g, a, wm, w f (h, g, a, 2)
)−V. As in the previous case, g depends on whether
the new job is in the same location as the couple or not.
Finally, consider the case where the wife was employed at wage w f in the previous
period and kept her job at the end of it. In this case, if the husband finds a job in the
same location, both spouses will be employed but if the husband finds a job in the
other location, they will migrate and she will quit. Therefore, the wage of the husband
if he finds a job in their location, wm
(
h, 0, a, w f
)
, will be the solution to:
max
wm
(
W
(
h, 0, a, wm, w f
)−W (h, 0, a, z, w f ))γ (J (m, h, 0, a, wm, w f )−V)1−γ (7)
On the other hand, if the husband gets employed in the other location, his wage,
wm
(
h, 1, a, w f
)
, will be the solution to:
max
wm
(
W (h, 1, a, wm, z)−W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f
))γ
(J (m, h, 1, a, wm, z)−V)1−γ (8)
6 This possibility can only arise if she was also unemployed the previous period. Otherwise, she could not
search.
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In this last case, the value if the husband does not get matched is W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f
)
,
that is, we assume that the wife will not quit her job until the bargaining has been
realized. For this reason, the wage of the husband when he finds a job in the other
location depends on the wage of his wife.
1.2.9 Leasing companies
In this economy, the houses that the couples rent are owned by leasing companies.
Following Gervais (2002), leasing companies are two-period lived institutions, with a
new cohort being born every period. In the first period, they buy houses, rent them
and pay for the depreciation. In the second period, they sell the houses. Their problem
is:
max
Ht, f
{(−1+ r f − δh) hHt, f + Ht, f h¯1+ i
}
where Ht, f denotes the total amount of rental housing in period t. For this maxi-
mization problem to be well defined, it must be that:
r f =
i
1+ i
+ δh (9)
which implies that the leasing companies make zero profits.
1.2.10 Equilibrium
Since both locations have the same productivity, we will consider a symmetric equilib-
rium in which they have the same share and distribution of the population and the
same number of firms. We omit all locational subscripts.
A steady-state equilibrium for a given set of policy arrangements {τ, τir}consists
of a set of value functions {W (ψ) , J (j,ψ)} , a set of decision rules {ga (ψ) , gh (ψ)}, a
time-invariant measure of agent types λ
(
ψ˜
)
, a set of prices{
r f , wj (h, g, a, ·)
}
, and market tightness θ such that:
1. Given prices, θ and the fiscal policy, the household’s decision rules solve the
dynamic program given by (1).
2. Given prices and the household’s decision rules, the firm solves (2)-(3).
3. θ satisfies V = 0 with V given by (4).
4. Wages satisfy (5)-(8) and the rent satisfies (9).
5. λ
(
ψ˜
)
is the invariant distribution generated by the meeting probability, separation
rate and the household’s decision rules.
1.3 the unemployment rate
In this section, we will derive the unemployment rate of home-owners and renters as a
function of their job finding and separation rates. For comparison purposes, we will
begin by deriving the aggregate unemployment rate in this economy. In order to do
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so, we must take into account that the inflow and outflow from unemployment must
be equal in steady state. The inflow will be generated by previous period employed
workers that today are unemployed, which is the product of the separation rate, sep,
and one minus the unemployment rate, 1 − u. The outflow will be generated by
previous period unemployed workers that today are employed, which is the product of
the job finding rate, f , and the unemployment rate, u. Therefore, in steady state the
unemployment rate must satisfy:
u =
sep
sep + f
(10)
On the other hand, we can decompose the inflows and outflows to unemployment of
home-owners and renters. We define µ (h1, e1, h2, e2) as the number of workers that in
this period have housing tenure h1, employment status e1 and in the following period
will have housing tenure h2 and employment status e2, with employment status defined
as e = 1 if the worker is employed and e = 0 if the worker is unemployed.
The inflow and the outflow of unemployed home-owners must be equal. The inflow
will be generated by previous period employed home-owners that become unemployed
and today do not sell their house, µ
(
h, 1, h, 0
)
; previous period employed renters
that become unemployed and today buy a house, µ
(
0, 1, h, 0
)
; and previous period
unemployed renters that do not find a job and today buy a house, µ
(
0, 0, h, 0
)
. The
outflow will be generated by previous period unemployed home-owners that do not
find a job and today sell their house, µ
(
h, 0, 0, 0
)
and by previous period unemployed
home-owners that find a job. Notice that in this last case the outflow is generated
whether they sell or not their house, µ
(
h, 0, h, 1
)
+ µ
(
h, 0, 0, 1
)
.
In steady state it must be that the inflow equals the outflow. Therefore:
µ
(
h, 1, h, 0
)
+ µ
(
0, 1, h, 0
)
+ µ
(
0, 0, h, 0
)
= µ
(
h, 0, 0, 0
)
+ µ
(
h, 0, h, 1
)
+ µ
(
h, 0, 0, 1
)
(11)
We can rewrite these variables in terms of the unemployment rate of renters and
home-owners.
µ (h1, e1, h2, e2) =
µ (h1, e1, h2, e2)
µ (h1, e1)
µ (h1, e1)
µ (h1)
µ (h1)
with µ (h1, e1) being the amount of workers with housing tenure h1 and employment
status e1 and µ (h1) being the amount of workers with tenure status h1. µ (h1, e1, h2, e2)
is the product of three terms. When h1 = h, the third term is the home-ownership rate,
we will denote it by HR = µ
(
h
)
. When e1 = 0 and h1 = h, the second term is the
unemployment rate of home-owners, and we will denote it by uh =
µ(h,0)
µ(h)
. Similarly,
the unemployment rate of renters is ur =
µ(0,0)
µ(0) . Substituting these terms, equation 11
becomes:
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µ
(
h, 1, h, 0
)
µ
(
h, 1
) (1− uh) HR + µ
(
0, 1, h, 0
)
µ (0, 1)
(1− ur) (1− HR) +
µ
(
0, 0, h, 0
)
µ (0, 0)
ur (1− HR) =
=
µ
(
h, 0, 0, 0
)
µ
(
h, 0
) uh HR + µ
(
h, 0, h, 1
)
+ µ
(
h, 0, 0, 1
)
µ
(
h, 0
) uh HR
Furthermore, we can define the separation rate of home-owners and renters as:
seph =
µ
(
h, 1, h, 0
)
+ µ
(
h, 1, 0, 0
)
µ
(
h, 1
) sepr = µ
(
0, 1, h, 0
)
+ µ (0, 1, 0, 0)
µ (0, 1)
And the job finding rate as:
fh =
µ
(
h, 0, h, 1
)
+ µ
(
h, 0, 0, 1
)
µ
(
h, 0
) fr = µ
(
0, 0, h, 1
)
+ µ (0, 0, 0, 1)
µ (0, 0)
So we can rewrite equation 11 as:
(
1− φh1
)
seph (1− uh) HR + φr1sepr (1− ur) (1− HR)+
+φr2 (1− fr) ur (1− HR) = φh2 (1− fh) uhHR + fhuhHR
with φh1 representing the proportion of home-owners that sell their house out of
all the previously employed home-owners that lost their job, φr1 representing the
proportion of renters that buy their house out of all the previously employed renters
that lost their job, φr2 representing the proportion of renters that buy their house out of
all the previously unemployed renters that do not find a job and φh2 representing the
proportion of home-owners that sell their house out of all the previously unemployed
home-owners that do not find their job
In this way, the unemployment rate of home-owners becomes:
uh =
(
1− φh1
)
seph(
1− φh1
)
seph + fh + φh2 (1− fh)
+
φr1sepr (1− ur) + φr2 (1− fr) ur(
1− φh1
)
seph + fh + φh2 (1− fh)
1− HR
HR
The first term of uh is similar to the equation we had found for u. It tells us that
the unemployment rate of home-owners depends on their separation rate from jobs
and their job finding rate. The only difference are φh1 and φ
h
2 , that imply that the
unemployment rate will be lower if home-owners sell their house when they are
unemployed. On the other hand, the second term of the equation of uh is positive only
if φr1 and φ
r
2 are positive, meaning that the unemployment rate of home-owners will be
higher if renters buy a house when they are unemployed.
We can follow the same procedure to calculate renters’ unemployment rate. The
inflow and the outflow of unemployed renters must be equal. The inflow will be
generated by previous period employed renters that become unemployed and today
do not buy a house, µ (0, 1, 0, 0); previous period employed owners that become
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unemployed and today sell their house, µ
(
h, 1, 0, 0
)
; and previous period unemployed
home-owners that do not find a job and today sell their house, µ
(
h, 0, 0, 0
)
. The
outflow will be generated by previous period unemployed renters that do not find a
job and today buy a house, µ
(
0, 0, h, 0
)
and by previous period unemployed renters
that find a job, µ
(
0, 0, h, 1
)
+ µ (0, 0, 0, 1). If we equate these two flows, we will have:
µ (0, 1, 0, 0) + µ
(
h, 1, 0, 0
)
+ µ
(
h, 0, 0, 0
)
= µ
(
0, 0, h, 0
)
+ µ
(
0, 0, h, 1
)
+ µ (0, 0, 0, 1)
Substituting the unemployment rates and home-ownership rate we will have:
(1− φr1) sepr (1− ur) (1− HR) + φh1seph (1− uh) HR+
+φh2 (1− fh) uhHR = φr2 (1− fr) ur (1− HR) + frur (1− HR)
Renters’ unemployment rate is:
ur =
(
1− φr1
)
sepr(
1− φr1
)
sepr + fr + φr2 (1− fr)
+
φh1 seph (1− uh) + φh2 (1− fh) uh(
1− φr1
)
sepr + fr + φr2 (1− fr)
HR
1− HR
Similar to the case of home-owners, renters’ unemployment rate is the sum of two
terms. The first term depends on the separation and job finding rate of renters, and
on the proportion of unemployed renters that become home-owners. The second
term accounts for the possibility that home-owners sell their house when they are
unemployed.
1.4 calibration
We calibrate the model to the US economy for the period 1980-2005.
1.4.1 Functional forms
We need to specify the functional form of the utility function and the meeting function.
We assume that the utility function of the couple is given by:
u (c) =
c1−σ
1− σ
The meeting function is:
M(ul + εun, vl) = kv
1−µ
l (ul + εun)
µ
Therefore αll = kθ
1−µ
l and αnl = εkθ
1−µ
l with θl =
vl
ul+εun
the market tightness in l.
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1.4.2 Parametrization
We now describe the parameters used in the model. Since the model period is a month,
parameters are expressed at monthly frequency except for migration rates. In Table 1
we have the parameters that are set exogenously because they are measured directly
from the data or because we take them directly from the literature. The down-payment
for buying a house is χ = 0.2, which is the usual number used in the literature on
housing (Chamber et al. (2009) estimate it from the American Housing Survey of 1995).
We set the interest rate to i = 0.327%, which corresponds to an annual interest rate
of 4%, as in Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008). Houses depreciate at rate δh = 0.0025.
The cost of posting a vacancy is ξ = 1.752, consistent with Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008), who calculate that the cost of posting a vacancy is 58.4% of labour productivity.
Following Shimer (2005), both the bargaining weight and the elasticity of the meeting
function on unemployment are set to µ = γ = 0.72. For the income tax, we use the
estimates of Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008), calculated for the period 1989-2004, τ = 0.2.
Finally, the tax on imputed rents is 0, τir = 0, since in US imputed rents are not taxed.
Table 1: Exogenous parameters
Parameter Source
σ = 2
ϑ = 0.5
χ = 0.2 Chamber et al. (2009)
i = 0.327% Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008)
δh = 0.0025 Harding et al. (2007)
ξ = 1.752 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
γ = µ = 0.72 Shimer 2005
τ = 0.2 Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2007)
τir = 0
The remaining parameters and the relevant targets are given in Table 2. In the table
we associate each parameter with a specific target for which it is particularly relevant.
We explain next each of the targets in more detail.
We use the median ratio of value to current income as a target. This information is
provided by the American Housing Survey (AHS), and they define it as the value of
the housing unit divided by the total current (family) income. This survey is conducted
every 2 years and we use as a target the average for the period 1989 to 2005, which is
2.5 in annual terms and 29 in monthly terms.
We also attempt to match an unemployment income equal to 40% of the mean
wage, as in Shimer (2005). The job finding rate is calculated as the average for the
period 1980-2005 of the series constructed by Robert Shimer.7 We obtain that the job
finding rate was 0.42. This series is constructed with the information from the Current
Population Survey (CPS).
7 For additional details, please see Shimer (2007) and his webpage
http://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/flows.
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Table 2: Estimated parameters
Parameter Target Source
β = 0.9942 home ownership rate= 66% CPS 1980-2005
s = 0.029 unemployment rate= 6.2% CPS 1980-2005
k = 0.53 job finding rate= 0.42 Shimer 1980-2005
z = 0.922 z = 40% mean wage Shimer 2005
h = 147 house/earnings= 29 AHS 1989-2005
ε = 0.12 annual migration rate= 2.4% CPS 1999-2005
φs = φb = 0.0058 migration rate owners/renters= 33% SIPP 2001
The following targets are obtained from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The
home-ownership rate, which is defined as the proportion of households that are owners
out of the total number of occupied households, was 66%, and the unemployment rate,
6.2%. Finally, given that the mechanism of the model relies on the effects of housing
tenure on workers mobility, we need a target on how mobile workers are. This target is
particularly important since the magnitude of the effect of tenure on the labor market
depends on the degree at which workers migrate in order to have a job. Since 1999, the
March CPS includes information on the reasons for moving. To calculate the migration
rate, we only consider moves caused by work related reasons. We obtain an annual
rate of 2.4% for the period from 1999 to 2005. Finally, from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) we obtain that in 2001 the migration rate of home-owners
was 33% the migration rate of renters. This last target is especially related to the
transaction costs that home-owners must pay when they move. We assume that they
incur the same cost for selling and for buying a house.
Table 3 summarizes the fit of the model with respect to the targeted moments.
Table 3: Calibration targets
Moment Data Model
home-ownership rate 66% 65%
unemployment rate 6.2% 6.5%
job finding rate 0.42 0.44
unemp. flow/wage 40% 39%
house/earnings 29 28
annual migration rate 2.4% 2.5%
migration rate owners/renters 33% 35%
1.5 home-ownership, migration and unemployment
We compute numerically the equilibrium. The model predicts an unemployment rate
equal to 6.3% for home-owners and equal to 6.9% for renters. This is so, although
home-owners migrate less than renters. We can make use of the equations derived in
1.5 home-ownership, migration and unemployment 23
section ?? to understand this result. The unemployment rate of home-owners is given
by:
uh =
(
1− φh1
)
seph(
1− φh1
)
seph + fh + φh2 (1− fh)
+
φr1sepr (1− ur) + φr2 (1− fr) ur(
1− φh1
)
seph + fh + φh2 (1− fh)
1− HR
HR
and for renters is
ur =
(
1− φr1
)
sepr(
1− φr1
)
sepr + fr + φr2 (1− fr)
+
φh1 seph (1− uh) + φh2 (1− fh) uh(
1− φr1
)
sepr + fr + φr2 (1− fr)
HR
1− HR
The equations show that there are three aspects that affect the unemployment rate
of home-owners and renters: their job finding rates, their separation rates and their
housing policy when they are unemployed. In Table 4 we find the values of these
variables in the benchmark model. On one hand, renters job finding rate is higher,
fr > fh due to their greater mobility. This leads to a lower unemployment rate for
renters. However, the separation rate is also higher for renters than for home-owners,
sepr > seph, which implies a higher unemployment rate for renters. This difference in
the separation rates is also due to the difference in mobility rates. Since unemployed
renters accept more often outside jobs, their partners, who may be employed, must
quit their job in order for the couple to migrate.
Table 4: Labour statistics in the benchmark model
uh fh seph φh1 φ
h
2
Home-owners 0.063 0.43 0.030 0.02 0.01
ur fr sepr φr1 φ
r
2
Renters 0.069 0.45 0.031 0 0
The third aspect that affects the unemployment rates by tenure is the housing policy.
In the benchmark model some unemployed home-owners sell their house when they
are close to their borrowing constraint, increasing the number of unemployed renters
and decreasing the number of unemployed home-owners. However, no couple buys a
house when at least one of its members is unemployed.
Our results are qualitatively consistent with the data from the CPS: the mean
unemployment rate for the period 1980-2005 of renters was 9.8%, whereas it was 5.3%
for owners. In order to further understand the role of couples in the unemployment
rate and separation rate, we make use of the SIPP of 2004 to calculate the separation
rate and unemployment rate of married and non married people by housing tenure
for that year. The separation rate is calculated as the proportion of employed workers
that become either unemployed or not in to the labour force. For the married, the
home-owner separation rate was 0.013 whereas the renter separation rate was 0.026.
For non married people, home-owners also had a lower separation rate than renters,
but the difference is much smaller: 0.034 for home-owners and 0.035 for renters. In
table 5, we report the separation rate of home-owners and renters disaggregated by
marital status, educational level and sex for 35 to 55 years old. Clearly, the separation
rate of married renters is higher than the separation rate of married home-owners for
all educational levels. We also find that this pattern also takes place in most cases for
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non married workers. However, the difference is higher in the case of the married,
which is consistent with the idea that being married raises the separation rate of renters.
The fact that this pattern also takes place for the non-married is also reasonable. For
example, the workers that expect their job to end soon, will tend to be renters, and this
mechanism will affect both married and non-married workers.
Table 5: Separation rates from employment (SIPP 2004)
Male Female
Owner Renter Owner Renter
Low skill
Married 0,012 0,018 0,025 0,032
Not Married 0,022 0,024 0,026 0,024
Medium skill
Married 0,009 0,022 0,014 0,028
Not Married 0,017 0,024 0,015 0,022
High skill
Married 0,007 0,018 0,012 0,025
Not Married 0,012 0,022 0,011 0,022
Mean of the monthly separation rate in 2004 for civilian noninstitutionalized
U.S. population with age between 35 and 55.
When we calculate the unemployment rate of home-owners and renters disaggre-
gated by demographic characteristics, we also find that, for all educational levels,
the unemployment rate of married renters is higher than the unemployment rate of
married home-owners. These rates are reported in Table 6. In most cases this pattern
also takes place for non-married individuals but the differences are not so large, with
the exception of non-married females with a low educational level.
Table 6: Unemployment rates (SIPP 2004)
Male Female
Owner Renter Owner Renter
Low skill
Married 0,041 0,054 0,076 0,119
Not Married 0,078 0,077 0,058 0,111
Medium skill
Married 0,023 0,060 0,031 0,058
Not Married 0,051 0,058 0,041 0,057
High skill
Married 0,016 0,041 0,023 0,063
Not Married 0,034 0,049 0,029 0,061
Mean of the monthly separation rate in 2004 for civilian noninstitutionalized
U.S. population with age between 35 and 55.
The results of the model are also consistent with empirical work that control for the
demographic characteristics of the individuals. Coulson and Fisher (2009), using data
from the 1990 Census, estimate that being home-owner decreases the probability of
being unemployed by 3.6%. Our model predicts that this probability decreases by 8.7%.
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Table 7: Home-ownership and the labour market
Benchmark Experiment
income tax 0.2 0.1988
tax on imputed rents 0 0.0021
home-ownership rate 65.4% 55.9%
monthly migration rate 0.21% 0.23%
- owners 0.130% 0.125%
- renters 0.370% 0.366%
unemployment rate 6.483% 6.476%
- owners8 6.261% 6.255%
- renters 6.902% 6.758%
job finding rate 43.724% 43.909%
- owners 43.115% 43.124%
- renters 44.765% 44.832%
separation rate 3.031% 3.041%
- owners 2.988% 2.986%
- renters 3.113% 3.111%
market tightness 0.439 0.440
We now conduct the experiment of decreasing the home-ownership rate by 10
percentage points. We do that by modifying the tax code in the economy. We increase
the tax on imputed rents, which reduces the willingness of households to own a house.
We also decrease the income tax such that the government budget is unchanged. We
define the government budget as:
B =
∫
Ψ˜
λ
(
ψ˜
) (
0.5τia + τpj
(
1− I (pj = z))− zI (pj = z)+ 0.5τir(r f − δh)gh (h, g, a, pm, p f )) dψ˜
with Ψ˜ = {m, f } x
{
0, h
}
x {0, 1} xAxPxP
The reduction in the home-ownership rate has a positive effect on migration, it raises
by 8%. However, the effect on the unemployment rate is small, it decreases by 0.1%.
The change in the unemployment rate is the result of two countervailing effects. On one
hand the job finding rate increases, which leads to a lower unemployment rate. On the
other hand the separation rate also increases, which implies a higher unemployment
rate. Overall, the positive effect on the job finding rate offsets the negative effect on
the separation rate and unemployment decreases. Our result contrasts with the model
with bargaining in Coulson and Fisher (2009), who find that the effect of a lower home-
ownership rate on expected profits is negative and may even lead to a higher aggregate
unemployment rate. However, it is in line with Head and Lloyd (2012), although they
estimate a higher effect. They find that a reduction of 10 percentage points in the
home-ownership rate decreases the unemployment rate by 6%. It is interesting to note
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that our model finds a positive relationship between the home-ownership rate and
aggregate unemployment although home-owners have a lower unemployment rate.
The increase in the job finding rate in our model is due to two reasons. First, the
higher proportion of renters makes the matching process more efficient because they
reject less vacancies than home-owners. But there is also a higher entry of firms which
shows in the increase in the market tightness. The higher entry of firms imply that
the job finding rate not only increases at the aggregate level but also if we measure it
separately for home-owners and renters. On the contrary, the increase in the separation
rate is only due to a compositional effect, since the separation rate of both home-owners
and renters decrease.
1.6 single-agent model
In this section, we consider a model identical to the benchmark case except for the fact
that the household is composed of just one individual. We refer to this model as the
single-agent model. We calibrate it to the same targets as in the benchmark economy.
The description of this model and the estimated parameters can be found in Appendix
A.1.4.
Table 8: Labour statistics in the Single-Agent model
uh fh seph φh1 φ
h
2
Home-owners 0.065 0.43 0.030 0.0002 0.0057
ur fr sepr φr1 φ
r
2
Renters 0.061 0.47 0.030 0 0
In contrast with the benchmark model, this model predicts a lower unemployment
rate for renters than for home-owners. As it can be seen in Table 8, renters unemploy-
ment rate in this case is only 6.1 whereas it is 6.5 for home-owners. This is due to
the big difference in the job finding rate across these two groups. On the other hand,
the two channels that contributed to the lower unemployment rate of home-owners
in the benchmark model, are less important in this case. First, the separation rate is
the same for renters and for home-owners. Second, the effect of housing policy is
qualitatively similar to the benchmark economy, home-owners change tenure when
they are unemployed and renters not, but quantitatively is less important.
1.7 conclusions
We have developed a model of joint search with multiple locations and have used this
framework to understand the potential effects of housing tenure on the labour market.
Home-owners lack of mobility make them more likely to remain unemployed longer.
However, the introduction of joint search into the analysis suggests that the workers
that migrate more find jobs at a higher rate but also separate from their jobs at a higher
rate. The longer unemployment duration of home-owners do not imply that they have
a higher unemployment rate. The calibrated version of the model predicts that owners’
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unemployment rate is 8.7% lower than for renters. However, we do not find a negative
relationship between the home-ownership rate and the unemployment rate. With a
home-ownership rate 10 percentage points lower than in the benchmark economy, the
unemployment rate would decrease only 0.1%. This analysis suggests that a policy that
provides incentives for home-ownership has a small effect on aggregate unemployment.
Finally, it is important to remark that the results of this model are based on the
assumption that the gains of migration only come through a higher efficiency at
matching workers and firms in two locations that are identical. However, Oswald (1997)
emphasizes the role of migration as a device to reduce unemployment by shifting
unemployed workers from depressing areas to booming areas. The implications of
introducing joint search in an environment with asymmetric locations is left for future
research.

2
T H E E F F E C T O F W O M E N PA RT I C I PAT I O N O N T H E L A B O U R
M A R K E T
The increasing attachment of women into the labour force has been one of the greatest
transformations of the labour market of the last century. Goldin (2006) describes this
process as being composed of two phases. The first one, called the “evolutionary
phase”, runs from the end of the XIX century to the late 1970s and was characterized
by a huge increase in the participation rate of women. However, at this stage they
generally did not build a professional career and were only the secondary earners in
the household.
The second phase of this process takes place from the late 1970s to nowadays. In this
period, the “revolutionary phase”, women participation rate has increased slightly but
the role of women in the labour market has changed in a fundamental way as they
have placed greater importance to career success. This means that they invest more in
human capital and accumulate more experience as they expect to remain attached to
the labour force during most of their life.
The shift of households from a structure in which only one member worked to one in
which the two spouses are part of the labour force has consequences on how economic
decisions are taken. In the latter case, the worker obtains insurance from the labour
income of the spouse. This allows to bargain higher wages and to reduce the level of
precautionary savings. On the other hand, the employment of the spouse imposes a
locational restriction to the worker, thus leading to lower wages and less mobility. This
implies that the fact that both spouses work has an effect on the aggregate variables of
the economy.
The objective of this paper is to study how the changing role of married women in
the labour market has affected unemployment, migration and savings. We develop
a model in which households are composed of couples that jointly decide their level
of savings, location and labour outcomes. Taking into account the phases of women
increasing attachment in the labour market, we compute the equilibrium of the model
in three different situations. In the first one, only the husband participates into the
labour force. In the second one, all women participate in the labour market but that
they have a lower productivity than men. Finally, we also consider the case in which
both spouses participate in the labour market and have the same productivity.
We find that when women participate into the labour market married men have a
slightly higher unemployment rate due to their higher separation rates. This is because
there can be moves generated by the wife jobs that will imply that the husband will
have to quit his job. The aggregate unemployment rate is higher when there is the
productivity gap because the lower productivity of women makes less profitable to
create jobs, which implies that women have a higher unemployment rate in this case.
The effect on migration and the level of savings is much larger than on unemployment.
When women participate into the labour market the couple migration rate doubles
because moves can also be originated by the wife finding a job. On the other hand, the
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level of savings is reduced by half, as women jobs reduce the income fluctuations of
the couple. Thus, the results of the model suggest that the increasing attachment of
women into the labour market have had an impact on migration and savings and, to a
lesser degree, on unemployment.
Related literature
There is a growing literature that takes into account the presence of two earner
households into the analysis of economic decisions. Guler et al. (2012) analyse the
differences in labour market outcomes between a framework where workers search
for jobs jointly in couples and a framework where workers search alone. They find
that income pooling within the couple allows workers to wait more time for better
jobs which translates into higher lifetime incomes. On the other hand, following the
argument already posed by Mincer (1978) they study how joint search imposes a
cost on the relocation of workers, which implies that they accept less jobs from other
locations and stay unemployed for longer. This locational tie implies that workers earn
a lower lifetime income. Consistent with this, Gemici (2012) finds that the locational
restriction of couples has a negative effect on wages and family stability.
The role of precautionary savings in two earner households has also been explored
in the literature. Otigueira and Siassi (2013) focus on the effect of intra-household risk
sharing for the level of precautionary savings set aside by the household, and specially
on the implications for the crowding out effects of unemployment insurance.
Finally, Guler and Taskin (2013) study how the decrease in the gender wage gap has
contributed to the evolution of migration. Contrary to our results, they find that the
reduction in the wage gap should have decreased migration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy.
Section 3 covers the calibration. In section 4 we use the model to study the effect of
women participation on unemployment, migration and savings and, finally, Section 5
concludes.
2.1 model economy
2.1.1 Setting
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by a measure 1 of infinitely lived indi-
viduals. There is also a continuum of firms. There are two locations, l and n. All
individuals are married. A couple (or household) consists of a male, m, and a female,
f , who share their income and wealth and work in the same location. Each individual
derives utility from a private composite consumption good, c. They are risk averse.
Employed workers produce ym units of consumption good each period if they are
males and y f units if they are females.
2.1.2 Households: housing and financial assets
Households can save at a constant interest rate i. We will denote their level of savings
by a with a ≥ 0. Let A = [0 , a]be the set of possible assets.
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2.1.3 Households: labour
Each member of the couple can be either employed or unemployed. Unemployed
workers receive flow income zj with j ∈ {m, f } and look for a job in both locations. We
assume that each location has a labour market for females and a labour market for
males. Let ujl be the number of unemployed workers and v
j
l the number of vacancies
in location l who are j ∈ {m, f }with m meaning male and f female. Similarly for
location n. In each labour market vacancies and job seekers meet randomly each period
according to an aggregate meeting function with constant returns to scale. In order
to account for the possibility that the unemployed search more efficiently locally, we
will assume that ujn enters into the meeting function of location l as εu
j
n and that ε < 1.
Thus, each period the number of meetings in location l for workers j will be given
by M(ujl + εu
j
n, v
j
l). With these assumptions, an unemployed worker j who lives in l
will meet a vacant job in this location with probability αjll =
M(ujl+εu
j
n,v
j
l)
ul+εun
. On the other
hand, an unemployed worker j who lives in location n will meet a vacant job in l with
probability αjnl = εα
j
ll . We define θ
j
l =
vjl
ujl+εu
j
n
as the market tightness in l for worker j.
An unemployed worker may meet one, two or zero vacant jobs. After meeting them,
the couple decides whether to match to one of them or to remain unemployed. If the
match is realized, wages are set by Nash bargaining over fixed-wage contracts. That is,
once the wage is bargained in the first period, the worker will receive the same wage
until the end of the employment relationship. Denote by P = [z, y] the set of possible
wages.
Employed workers cannot search. The employment relationship may end exoge-
nously with probability s in each period. A match may also end if a worker quits. We
only allow workers to quit if their spouse receives a job offer from the other location
and they decide to accept it and migrate.
2.1.4 Timing of events
Each period is composed of the following stages:
1. Unemployed workers and vacant jobs meet in the labour market.
2. Couples with unemployed workers choose a job and bargaining for new matches
takes place.
3. The spouses of the workers that have accepted a job in another city quit and they
both migrate.
4. Production takes place, couples receive their income and decide their level of
consumption and financial assets for that period.
5. Employed workers lose their job with probability s.
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2.1.5 Household’s decision problem
We describe next the Bellman equations of the couples at the point in which they have
already bargained over the wage and the migration decision has already taken place.
In stage 4,W
(
a, pm, p f
)
is the value of a couple that in this period has level of assets
a, whose husband has labour payoff pm and whose wife has labour payoff p f . The
labour payoff, pm is the wage of the husband if he is employed and is equal to zm if
the husband is unemployed. Similarly for the wife. Notice that the value of the couple
does not depend on whether they migrated or not at the beginning of the period. To
simplify notation, we omit the location from the state of the couple.
The problem of the household in stage 4 is the following:
W
(
a, pm, p f
)
= max
cm ,c f ,a′≥0
{
ϑu (cm) + (1− ϑ) u
(
c f
)
+ βW˜
(
a′, pm, p f
)}
(12)
st cm + c f + a′ = pm + p f + (1+ i) a
The couple chooses consumption, c, and the level of financial assets they want to
keep, a′, that maximizes its lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint. The budget
constraint states that the couple’s consumption expenditure, cm + c f , plus the level of
savings that they want to keep, a′, must be equal to the labour income of the spouses
plus their financial assets and the income from them.
Their lifetime utility is the sum of their current utility plus a continuation value,
W˜
(
a′, pm, p f
)
. The current utility is the sum of the utility of both spouses with Pareto
weights given by ϑ and (1− ϑ). The continuation value differs depending on the
employment status of the couple,
(
pm, p f
)
. We will explain first the case of a couple
where both husband and wife are employed, then the case where only one of them is
employed and last we will describe the continuation value when both are unemployed.
2.1.5.1 Husband and wife employed
If both members of the couple are employed, we will have that pm = wm and p f = w f .
Then, their continuation value is:
W˜
(
a, wm, w f
)
= (1− s)2 W
(
a, wm, w f
)
+ (1− s) sW
(
a, wm, z f
)
+s (1− s)W
(
a, z, w f
)
+ s2W
(
a, zm, z f
)
That is, in the next period, they both will keep their job with probability (1− s)2,
they both will lose their job with probability s2and with probability s (1− s), only the
husband will keep his job and with the same probability only the wife will keep her job.
In neither of the cases the couple migrates, since only unemployed workers who have
found a job in another location and their spouses can migrate. Finally, since wages are
constant during the employment relationship, next period the workers that keep their
job receive the same labour payoff as in the current period.
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2.1.5.2 One spouse employed
If only the husband is employed1, the continuation value, W˜
(
a, wm, z f
)
, will be the
expectation over two outcomes: the value of the couple at the beginning of the period
if he keeps his job and the value if he loses it. We denote by W˜−s
(
a, wm, z f
)
the first
case and W˜s
(
a, zm, z f
)
the second one. Therefore, the continuation value is:
W˜
(
a, wm, z f
)
= (1− s) W˜−s
(
a, wm, z f
)
+ sW˜s
(
a, zm, z f
)
We describe next how W˜−s
(
a, wm, z f
)
is calculated. This value is the expectation
over the outcomes represented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Employment decision when the husband keeps his job
Since in the previous period the wife was unemployed, at the beginning of this one,
she may meet a vacancy from the location where they live, “inside vacancy”, from the
other location, “outside vacancy”, both or none. We had defined the probability of
meeting an inside vacancy as αjll when the worker lives in l and α
j
nn when the worker
lives in n. Since we are abstracting away from location, let the probability of meeting an
inside vacancy be denoted as αji for j ∈ {l, n}. Similarly, we will denote the probability
of meeting an outside vacancy as αjo.
The value of the couple at the beginning of the period can be calculated as the sum of
four terms which correspond to the four possible outcomes. The first term corresponds
to the case when she does not meet any vacancy, the second, when she only meets an
outside vacancy, the third, meeting an inside vacancy and the last corresponds to the
case when she meets both:
W˜−s
(
a, wm, z f
)
=
(
1− α fi
) (
1− α fo
)
W
(
a, wm, z f
)
+
(
1− α fi
)
α
f
o max
{
W
(
a, zm, w f (1, a, wm)
)
, W
(
a, wm, z f
)}
+α
f
i
(
1− α fo
)
max
{
W
(
a, wm, w f (0, a, wm)
)
, W
(
a, wm, z f
)}
1 The value of a couple where only the wife is employed works analogously.
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+α
f
i α
f
o max
{
W
(
a, wm, w f (0, a, wm)
)
, W
(
a, zm, w f (1, a, wm)
)
, W
(
a, wm, z f
)}
Depending on which vacancies the wife meets, the couple must decide if she matches
to some vacancy and if the husband must quit his job. As a result, they will be in
one of the three cases represented in the third column of Figure 3. These cases are
that the couple remains in the same employment status with the husband employed
and the wife unemployed, that the wife gets employed in the same location so they
both are employed or that the wife gets employed in the other location and they both
migrate. In the last two cases the continuation value of the couple will depend on the
wage that the wife will earn in her new job. We will derive how the wage is bargained
in subsection 2.1.7, now we just take into account that the wage will depend on the
migration status of the couple, which we will denote by g, their level of assets, a, and
both the employment status and wage of her husband, that we will summarise as wm,
so w f = w f (g, a, wm). We can now describe the continuation value of the couple.
If the wife does not meet any vacancy, the couple has no choice and must remain in
the same employment status as before. The value of the couple will be W
(
a, wm, z f
)
.
If the wife only meets an outside vacancy, she can accept it or reject it. If she rejects
it, they will remain in the same employment status and have value W
(
a, wm, z f
)
.
But if she accepts it, the husband must quit and they both migrate. Then, their
value will be W
(
a, zm, w f (1, a, wm)
)
. Consider now the case where the wife only
meets an inside vacancy. If she accepts, in the following period they will be both
employed, W
(
a, wm, w f (0, a, wm)
)
, and if she rejects they will remain with the same
employment status as before W
(
a, wm, z f
)
. Finally, if the wife meets both vacancies,
she can either match the inside vacancy, match the outside vacancy or reject both. The
value of the couple in each of these cases will be, respectively, W
(
a, wm, w f (0, a, wm)
)
,
W
(
a, zm, w f (1, a, wm)
)
and W
(
a, wm, z f
)
.
Let’s consider now W˜s
(
a, zm, z f
)
, which is the value of the couple if the husband lost
his job at the end of the previous period. Again, we must take into account that the
wife may meet and outside vacancy, an inside vacancy, both or none. As the husband
has lost his job, his employment status in the wage function of the wife will be denoted
by, 1, so w f = w f (g, a, 1). In Figure 4 are summarized the decisions of the couple for
each of these cases.
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Figure 4: Employment decision when the husband loses his job
Therefore, the value of the couple at the beginning of the period is:
W˜s
(
a, zm, z f
)
=
(
1− α fi
) (
1− α fo
)
W
(
a, zm, z f
)
+
(
1− α fi
)
α
f
o max
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(
a, zm, w f (1, a, 1)
)
, W
(
a, zm, z f
)}
+α
f
i
(
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)
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W
(
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)
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(
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f
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o max
{
W
(
a, zm, w f (0, a, 1)
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, W
(
a, zm, w f (1, a, 1)
)
, W
(
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If the wife
does not meet any vacancy, both the husband and the wife are unemployed in the
following period and their value will be W
(
a, zm, z f
)
. If the wife only meets an outside
vacancy, she can accept it or reject it. If she rejects it, they will be both unemployed
and have value W
(
a, zm, z f
)
. But if she accepts, they migrate and obtain the value
W
(
a, zm, w f (1, a, 1)
)
. The third case is that the wife only meets an inside vacancy.
If she accepts, they will have value W
(
a, zm, w f (0, a, 1)
)
, and if she rejects they will
obtain W
(
a, zm, z f
)
. Finally, if the wife meets both vacancies, she can either match the
inside vacancy, match the outside vacancy or reject both. The value of the couple in
each of these cases will be, respectively, W
(
a, zm, w f (0, a, 1)
)
, W
(
a, zm, w f (1, a, 1)
)
and
W
(
a, zm, z f
)
.
2.1.5.3 Neither member of the couple is employed
If both members of the couple are unemployed, their value will be given by W
(
a, zm, z f
)
.
In this case, they both will search and in the following period, they can meet vacancies
from both locations. We relegate the description of the possible outcomes to the
Appendix.
Finally, from the household problem we can derive the savings rule, which will be
given by a∗ = ga
(
a, pm, p f
)
.
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2.1.6 Firms problem
We now turn to the problem of the firm. There are many firms, each with one job.
The per period profits of the firm are constant for the duration of the match, given
that the wage is constant. However, the probability that the match ends depends on
the state of the couple because so does the probability that a worker quits. Thus, we
will describe first the value of a filled job that employs a worker whose spouse is also
employed. Then, we will describe the case where the spouse is unemployed. Note also
that the profits of the firm not only depend on the state of the couple but also on which
member of the couple it is employing.
2.1.6.1 Both members of the couple are employed
The value of a firm that employs the husband when the couple is in state
(
a, wm, w f
)
is
J
(
m, a, wm, w f
)
with:
J
(
m, a, wm, w f
)
= ym − wm + 11+ i
[
(1− s)2 J
(
m, a∗, wm, w f
)
+ s (1− s) J
(
m, a∗, wm, z f
)
+ sV
]
(13)
where a∗ = ga
(
a, pm, p f
)
.
In that period the firm will obtain the productivity minus the wage. In the following
period, with probability (1− s) the match will continue and with probability s the
match will end, in the latter case the value of the job will be V. However, if the match
continues, either the wife keeps her job and the value of the firm is J
(
m, a∗, wm, w f
)
or
she loses her job and the value of the firm is J
(
m, a∗, wm, z f
)
.
2.1.6.2 Only one member of the couple is employed
The value of a firm that employs the husband when the couple is in state
(
a, wm, z f
)
is
denoted by J
(
m, a, wm, z f
)
. It consists of current profits, ym − wm, plus a continuation
value that depends on the employment status of both spouses. If the husband loses
his job, that is, if the match ends for exogenous reasons, the continuation value of the
firm is V. If the match does not end for exogenous reasons we must take into account
the value of the firm when the wife becomes employed in the same location, when she
becomes employed in the other location or when she remains unemployed.
In the first case, the case in which the wife finds a job in the same location, the
continuation value of the firm will be the value of employing the husband when both
spouses are employed, J
(
m, a∗, wm, w f (0, a∗, wm)
)
. The probability of this event, that
we denote by p2, is the sum of two terms. The first one is the probability that the wife
meets an inside and an outside vacancy, α fi α
f
o , and matches the inside vacancy. We
must take into account that acceptance will take place if the couple is not worse off than
when they migrate W
(
a∗, wm, w f (·)
)
≥W
(
a∗, z, w f (·)
)
or than when the wife remains
unemployed, W
(
a∗, wm, w f (·)
)
≥W (a∗, wm, z). The second term is the probability that
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the wife only meets an inside vacancy, α fi
(
1− α fo
)
, and accepts. In this case acceptance
will take place if the couple is not worse off than when the wife remains unemployed,
W
(
a∗, wm, w f (·)
)
≥W (a∗, wm, z). Thus, p2 can be calculated as:
p2 =
[
α
f
i α
f
o I
(
W(,a∗ ,wm ,w f ( ))≥W(a∗ ,zm ,w f ( ))
)
+ α
f
i
(
1− α fo
)]
I
(
W(a∗ ,wm ,w f ( ))≥W(a∗ ,wm ,z)
)
If the wife becomes employed in the other location, the husband will quit his job and
migrate with her, so the continuation value for the firm will be zero. The probability of
this event is denoted by p1. It is also the sum of two terms. The first one is the probabil-
ity that the wife meets an inside and an outside vacancy, α fi α
f
o , and matches the outside
vacancy. We must take into account that acceptance will take place if the couple is bet-
ter off than when she matches the inside vacancy W
(
a∗, zm, w f (·)
)
> W
(
a∗, wm, w f (·)
)
or than when the wife remains unemployed, W
(
a∗, zm, w f (·)
)
> W
(
a∗, wm, z f
)
. The
second term is the probability that the wife only meets an outside vacancy,
(
1− α fi
)
α
f
o ,
and accepts. In this case acceptance will take place if the couple is better off than
when the wife remains unemployed, W
(
a∗, zm, w f (·)
)
> W
(
a∗, wm, z f
)
. Thus, p1 can be
calculated as:
p1 =
[
α
f
i α
f
o I
(
W(a∗ ,zm ,w f ( ))>W(a∗ ,wm ,w f ( ))
)
+
(
1− α fi
)
α
f
o
]
I
(
W(a∗ ,zm ,w f ( ))>W(,a∗ ,wm ,z f )
)
If the wife remains unemployed, the continuation value of the firm will be the value
of employing the husband when the wife is unemployed, J
(
m, a∗, wm, z f
)
. This will
occur with probability 1− p2 − p1.
Therefore, the value of a firm that employs the husband when the wife is unemployed
is given by:
J
(
m, a, wm, z f
)
= ym − wm + 11+ i
[
(1− s) p2 J
(
m, a∗, wm, w f (0, a∗, wm)
)
+ (1− p2 − p1) (1− s) J
(
m, a∗, wm, z f
)
+ (s + p1 (1− s))V
]
(14)
2.1.6.3 Value of a vacancy
To create a job, a firm first posts a vacancy. There is a flow cost of posting a vacancy,
denoted by ξ. In the following period, a firm in the labour market for j will hire a
worker with probability αjr. Let λhire
(
j, g, a, pm, p f
)
be the density of the unemployed
workers that a firm can hire. To simplify notation we denote ψ˜ =
(
j, g, a, pm, p f
)
, so the
density can be written as λhire
(
j, g, a, pm, p f
)
= λhire
(
ψ˜
)
.2 Notice that the value of a
filled job is a function of ψ˜, J
(
ψ˜
)
. The value of a vacancy in labour market j is:
Vj = −ξ + α
j
r
1+ i
∫
Ψ
J
(
ψ˜
)
λhire
(
ψ˜
)
dψ˜ (15)
2 λhire
(
ψ˜
)
and αjr are derived in the Appendix.
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with Ψ = {j} x
{
0, h
}
x {0, 1} xAxPxP.
2.1.7 Wage determination
The wage is fixed for the duration of the match and determined through Nash bargain-
ing between the firm and the worker at the beginning of their employment relationship.
We will describe here the wage determination of the husband. The same logic applies
for the wife. The wage of the husband will depend on the migration status of the cou-
ple, g, their level of assets, a, and the employment status of the wife. The employment
status of the wife in the wage function includes more possibilities than her employment
status in the value of the couple. For the case of the wage function, we must consider
the case in which the wife is employed at the moment of bargaining, the case in which
she is unemployment but is also being hired that period and the case in which she is
unemployed and remains unemployed that period. In the first case, the employment
status of the wife will be given by w f , so the wage of the husband will be wm
(
g, a, w f
)
.
In the second case, the case in which the wife is also being hired, the employment
status of the wife will be denoted by 2 and the wage of the husband will be wm (g, a, 2).
Finally, if the wife remains unemployed, her employment status will be denoted by 1
and the wage of the husband will be wm (g, a, 1).
Consider a couple with a level of assets a. If the wife is unemployed at the beginning
of the period and does not get a job, the wage of the husband, wm (g, a, 1), will be the
solution to:
max
wm
(
W
(
a, wm, z f
)−W (a, zm, z f ))γ (J (m, a, wm, z f )−V)1−γ (16)
The first term, W
(
a, wm, z f
)−W (a, zm, z f ), represents the gains from the match for the
couple if the husband gets employed at wage wm where W
(
a, wm, z f
)
is the value of
the couple if he gets matched and W
(
a, zm, z f
)
is the value if he remains unemployed.
The second term, J
(
m, a, wm, z f
)−V, represents the gains from the match for the firm.
If the wife is unemployed at the beginning of the period and both the husband and
the wife find a job at the same time3, the wage of the husband, wm (g, a, 2), will be the
solution to:
max
wm
(
W
(
a, wm, w f (g, a, 2)
)−W (a, zm, w f (g, a, 2)))γ·
·
(
J
(
m, a, wm, w f (g, a, 2)
)−V)1−γ (17)
In this case, the value of the couple if he gets matched will be the value of be-
ing both spouses employed, W
(
a, wm, w f (g, a, 2)
)
, and the value of the couple if he
does not get matched is the value of the couple when only the wife gets employed
W
(
a, z, w f (g, a, 2)
)
. Consistent with this, the gains from the match for the firm are
J
(
m, a, wm, w f (g, a, 2)
)−V.
Finally, consider the case where the wife was employed at wage w f in the previous
period and kept her job at the end of it. In this case, if the husband finds a job in the
3 This possibility can only arise if she was also unemployed the previous period. Otherwise, she could not
search.
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same location, both spouses will be employed and they will not migrate, g = 0, but if
the husband finds a job in the other location, they will migrate, g = 1, and she will quit.
Therefore, the wage of the husband if he finds a job in their location, wm
(
0, a, w f
)
, will
be the solution to:
max
wm
(
W
(
a, wm, w f
)−W (a, zm, w f ))γ (J (m, a, wm, w f )−V)1−γ (18)
On the other hand, if the husband gets employed in the other location, his wage,
wm
(
1, a, w f
)
, will be the solution to:
max
wm
(
W
(
a, wm, z f
)−W (a, zm, w f ))γ (J (m, a, wm, z f )−V)1−γ (19)
In this last case, the value if the husband does not get matched is W
(
a, zm, w f
)
, that
is, we assume that the wife will not quit her job until the bargaining has been realized.
For this reason, the wage of the husband when he finds a job in the other location
depends on the wage of his wife. If the job is in the other location, they will migrate
and g = 1, whereas if the job is in their location they will not migrate.
2.1.8 Equilibrium
Since both locations have the same productivity, we will consider a symmetric equilib-
rium in which they have the same share and distribution of the population and the
same number of firms. We omit all locational subscripts.
A steady-state equilibrium consists of a set of value functions
{
W
(
a, pm, p f
)
, J
(
j, a, pm, p f
)}
,
a decision rule
{
ga
(
a, pm, p f
)}
, a time-invariant measure of agent types λ
(
ψ˜
)
, a set of
prices{
wj (h, g, a, ·)
}
, and market tightness
{
θj
}
such that:
1. Given prices and market tightness, the household’s decision rules solve the
dynamic program given by (12).
2. Given prices and the household’s decision rules, the firm solves (13)-(14).
3. θj satisfies Vj = 0 with Vj given by (15).
4. Wages satisfy (16)-(19).
5. λ
(
ψ˜
)
is the invariant distribution generated by the meeting probability, separation
rate and the household’s decision rules.
2.2 calibration
We calibrate the model to the US economy for 2000-2009. In this period, we assume
that both males and females are in the labour force and have the same productivity:
ym = y f .
2.2.1 Functional forms
We need to specify the functional form of the utility function and the meeting function.
We assume that the utility function of the couple is given by:
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u (c) =
c1−σ
1− σ
The meeting function is:
M(ujl + εu
j
m, v
j
l) = kv
j1−µ
l
(
ujl + εu
j
m
)µ
Therefore αjll = kθ
j1−µ
l and α
j
ml = εkθ
j1−µ
l with θ
j
l =
vjl
ujl+εu
j
m
the market tightness in l.
2.2.2 Parametrization
We now describe the parameters used in the model. Since the model period is a month,
parameters are expressed at monthly frequency except for migration rates. In Table 9
we have the parameters that are set exogenously because they are measured directly
from the data or because we take them directly from the literature. We set the interest
rate to i = 0.327%, which corresponds to an annual interest rate of 4%, as in Díaz
and Luengo-Prado (2008). The cost of posting a vacancy is ξ = 1.752, consistent with
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), who calculate that the cost of posting a vacancy is
58.4% of labour productivity. Following Shimer (2005), both the bargaining weight and
the elasticity of the meeting function on unemployment are set to µ = γ = 0.72.
Table 9: Exogenous parameters
Parameter Source
σ = 2
ϑ = 0.5
ym
y f
= 1
i = 0.327% Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008)
ξ = 1.752 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
γ = µ = 0.72 Shimer 2005
The remaining parameters and the relevant targets are given in Table 10. In the table
we associate each parameter with a specific target for which it is particularly relevant.
We explain next each of the targets in more detail.
We use that median ratio of financial assets to income for married workers in 2001
was 7.95 as a target. This information calculated from the data provided by the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF).
We also attempt to match an unemployment income equal to 40% of the mean
wage, as in Shimer (2005). The job finding rate and the unemployment rate of married
workers is calculated as the average for the period 2000-2004 with the information from
the Current Population Survey (CPS). We obtain that the job finding rate during this
period was 0.35 and the unemployment rate 3.3%.
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Table 10: Estimated parameters
Parameter Target Source
β = 0.9965 median assets to income= 7.96 SCF 2001
s = 0.024 unemployment rate= 3.3% CPS 2000-2004
k = 0.52 job finding rate= 0.35 CPS 2000-2004
zm = z f = 1.19 zj = 40% mean wage j Shimer 2005
ε = 0.08 annual migration rate= 2.1% CPS 1999-2005
Finally, we have as a target the migration rate for the period 1999-2005 with the
information from the March Current Population Survey. In the calculations we only
consider moves caused by work related reasons. We obtain an annual rate of 2.4% for
the period from 1999 to 2005.
Table 11 summarizes the fit of the model with respect to the targeted moments.
Table 11: Calibration targets
Moment Data Model
median assets to income 7.96 8.00
unemployment rate 3.3% 3.3%
job finding rate 0.35 0.35
unemp. flow/wage 40% 40%
annual migration rate 2.1% 2.1%
2.3 results
In this section, we will study the behaviour of the model economy for different stages
of the women entry into the labour force. The model will allow as to isolate the effect
of women attachment into the labour force from other changes that took place during
this period. We will compare the level of unemployment, migration and savings in an
economy where only the husband works, which would correspond to the American
economy at the beginning of the twentieth century to the current situation where
both husband and wife have similar professional careers. We will also compute the
equilibrium of the model for an intermediate situation, where both spouses work but
women have a lower productivity than men. This situation would correspond to the
end of the seventies and eighties. This is because in 1980 most of the expansion in
women participation rate had already taken place. The participation rate of married
white females between 35 and 44 years was 10% in 1930 and slightly above 60% in
19804. On the other hand, women’s earnings as a percentage of men’s earnings was
between 58% and 60% for all the sixties and seventies. In 1980 was still 60% but then it
started increasing to above 75% in the 2000s. The lower earnings received by women
were largely due to a lower level of human capital. For example, college graduation
4 Goldin (2006)
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rates of males had been larger than that of women for all the first part of the twentieth
century. However, this gap started to narrow until the cohorts born in 1960, thus those
that went to college around 1980, and from then on women graduation rates have
out-weighted men’s ones.5
We model this process as an exogenous change in women’s productivity. Goldin
(2006) explains how the increase in the participation rate that took place between the
thirties and fifties was mainly the result of new information technologies that created
nice jobs, like clerical jobs, and the increase in high school graduation. Continued
participation into the labour force was unexpected for these generation of women. This
would contrast with the newer generations, that would anticipate longer periods in
the labour force. Therefore, the percentage of women that graduated from college
increased. We model the increase in the human capital of women as an exogenous
change in their productivity.
In Table 12 we report the equilibrium of the model for the three situations we have
described6. We find that the migration rate is lowest when women are out of the
labour force and highest when both spouses have the same level of productivity. This
result contrasts with the idea that having a spouse who works imposes a restriction
to mobility. The reason for this finding is that when both spouses are part of the
labour force, they both may find a job in another location, increasing the probability
of migration, whereas in the other case only the husband may find a job opportunity
outside. Comparing the two cases where women are part of the labour force, we find
that migration is highest when women have the same productivity as men. This is
because in this later case, the level of migration originated from wife jobs is higher.
We measure the level of savings with the median level of assets to income that
couples keep. When the wife takes part of the labour force, she provides insurance to
the spouse and the level of savings accumulated by the couple is lower. We find that
the effect on savings is considerable, as the ratio of assets to income diminishes from
16, when only the husband works, to 8, when there is no gap in productivity between
the spouses.
Finally, the model also provides with some predictions on the unemployment rate.
We find that in the case in which females have a lower productivity than males, their
unemployment rate is higher. This is so because it is not so profitable for firms to incur
the cost of posting a vacancy for a female although the wage they pay to females is
lower than to males. This can be seen, in their lower job finding rate. On the other hand,
the higher unemployment rate of females is also due to their higher separation rate
compared to males. As the family migrates more often for the employment prospects
of the husband, the wife must also quit her job more often.
Interestingly, the unemployment rate of males differs in the three situations. When
both spouses have the same productivity and are part of the labour force, males
unemployment rate is higher. This result is due to the higher separation rate of males
and despite their higher job finding probability. The reason for the higher separation
rate of males is that if their wife finds a job in another location, they may migrate. The
increase in the job finding probability can be explained from the increase in market
5 Goldin and Katz (2009), page 249.
6 For the case with the productivity gap, we assume that z f = 0.6zm.
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Table 12: Three stages of the labour market
y f /ym - 0.6 1
annual migration rate 1.0% 1.6% 2.1%
- only male finds job 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
- only female finds job - 0.6% 1.0%
- both spouses find job - 0.0% 0.0%
assets to income 16 9 8
job finding rate 34.6% 31.5% 34.7%
- males 34.6% 34.4% 34.7%
- females - 29.0% 34.7%
separation rate 1.10% 1.16% 1.19%
- males 1.10% 1.14% 1.19%
- females - 1.18% 1.19%
unemployment rate 3.1% 3.6% 3.3%
- males 3.1% 3.2% 3.3%
- females - 3.9% 3.3%
mean wage 2.969 2.374 2.967
- males 2.969 2.968 2.967
- females - 1.775 2.967
tightness. The mean wage paid to males in this situation is lower, implying that it is
more profitable for firms to employ males in this case.
The exercise we have realized is an attempt to understand the effect that the incorpo-
ration of married women in the labour market have produced on the economy. The
results are at odds with the idea that having two workers in the family should reduce
migration. This idea is posed in Molloy et al. (2011) as a possible explanation for
the decrease in migration that took place from the 80s. However, as they report, the
percentage of households with two earners has been stable during this period. On the
contrary, the main increase in the participation rates of married women began in the
1950s, but in this period the migration rate was stable. On the other hand, Guler and
Taskin (2013) propose the reduction in the wage gap that started in the 1970s as the
factor generating the decrease in migration. The results of our model do not support
this view.
We can also measure the relationship between women participation and migration
through the variation at the cross sectional level. Consistent with our model, Gemici
(2011) has documented that couples where both spouses have college degree have
higher migration rates than couples when only one of the spouses belongs to this
group. This evidence is in line with our results, but more direct evidence is needed on
the effect of working spouses.
With respect to the evolution of personal savings rate, it has been found that the it has
decreased in the US since the 1980s. This trend can be partly explained by measurement
issues, wealth effects of the stock market, the increase of credit or to social security
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programs (Gokhale et al. (1996), Lusardi et al. (2001)). However, the survey in Guidolin
and Jeneusse (2007) concludes that these explanations remain insufficient. It is also
interesting to note that the savings rate has also decreed during this period in other
countries like Canada, Australia and UK. The results of our model suggest that women
participation into the labour force could have contributed to this trend.
Table 13: Unemployment rate
Married men Married women
1955-1964 3.5 5.1
1965-1974 2.3 4.7
1975-1984 4.5 6.4
1985-1994 4.0 4.5
1995-2004 2.9 3.3
2005-2012 4.4 4.4
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics
Finally, we will briefly compare the results of our model with the evolution of the
unemployment rate. We have data on the unemployment rate of married men and
women since 1955. As it can be seen in table 13, the unemployment rate of married
women had been, since 1955, higher than the unemployment rate of married men but
these differences have been decreasing over the years until the current period in which
they are equal.
There are few studies that deal with the unemployment rate of married women.
Johnson (1983) attributes their high unemployment to a higher rate of transitions into
and out of the labour force but Azmat et al. (2006) do not find strong evidence for
that. Our model with differences in human capital across gender is consistent with the
narrowing of the unemployment rate gap that took place in the last years.
Figure 5: Married men unemployment rate
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics
Our model also predicts that women participation in the labour market generated a
slightly higher unemployment rate for married men. In Figure 5, we can see that there
was a positive trend during these years.
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2.4 conclusions
The labour market experienced an important transformation with the entry of women
into the labour market. This process, not only increased the size of the labour force,
but also changed the structure of households, with an increasing proportion of the two
earner type. In this kind of households, workers must coordinate their search for jobs
within the family.
In this paper, we have studied the implications of these process for the level of
unemployment, migration and savings of married people. Our findings point to an
increase in work related migration and a decrease in the level of savings. We also find
that this process has led to a slight increase in aggregate unemployment.
These results suggest that the role of women should be taken into account in order
to understand the evolution of the labour market, mobility and savings of the last
decades.

3
H U M A N C A P I TA L A N D M A R K E T S I Z E
3.1 introduction
The distribution of skills differs across cities. In the US it has been found a positive,
although small, relationship between average skill and city size.1 Big cities have a
higher proportion of high skilled workers. Glaeser and Resseger (2010) find a 2.8
increase in the percentage of college graduates in a city for an increase of 1% in
population size for US in 2000. However, in big cities the distribution of skills is
also more unequal than in small ones.2 These differences in the skill composition is
an important factor in order to understand productivity differences across locations.
Combes et al. (2008) estimate that “differences in the skill composition of the labour
force account from 40 to 50% of aggregate spatial wage disparities” in France.
This uneven distribution of skills across locations may be the result of workers
sorting to those locations that favour more their level of skills. However, it also implies
that city size must have an effect on the decision to become skilled. In this paper we
consider how the size of cities affect the incentives to acquire human capital. This
issue is of interest because it implies that the size of cities may be a determinant of the
distribution of skills of the entire economy.
Big cities are characterized by big labour markets. Consider a big labour market
along some period of time. Neither the number of workers that may be looking for
a job nor the number of vancant jobs is constant. There is some variability on these
numbers. However, the variability is small relative to the size of the market. Therefore,
there is low uncertainty on the level of market tightness that the market will have at
some moment in time. On the contrary, if the labour market is small, changes in the
number of workers and jobs between different periods cause a great variability relative
to the size of the market. These differences between big and small markets may have
an effect on the decision to be skilled. Acquiring skills increases the chances to find a
job when there is an excess of unemployed workers in the market. However, it is not so
profitable when tightness is high and all workers get employed. Since in small markets
there is more uncertainty on the level of tightness that the workers will encounter,
there is also more uncertainty on the gains of this investment, with implications on the
decision of the worker.
In this paper, we formalise this idea with a static model of mismatch with hetero-
geneity in human capital. Under this setting, the number of workers and vacancies in
the market are random. However, the uncertainty on these numbers is decreasing with
the size of the market. If there is an excess of workers, the ones with the lowest skills
will be unemployed. However, workers can invest in human capital before entering the
market in order to improve their ranking.
1 Bacolod et al. (2009)
2 Bacolod et al. (2009) and Eeckhout et al. (2011)
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In this environment, we define market tightness as the ratio of the expected number
of vacancies to the expected number of workers. Therefore, the size of the market is
large if the expected number of workers is large, for a given level of market tightness.
We find that the effect of market size on the probability of finding a job for a worker
with a given rank depends on market tightness. When the market is tight, the job
finding probability of all workers increases with market size. However, if this ratio is
low, the job finding probability of the workers with lower rank decreases with the size
of the market, while the probability for the other workers increases.
The effect of market size on the job finding probability determines the effect on
the distribution of human capital in equilibrium. For tight markets, the distribution
converges to the top levels as market size increases. When market tightness is low,
the distribution spreads to the extremes in bigger markets. The workers with lower
rank invest less in human capital than if they were in smaller cities but the workers
with higher rank invest more. Numerical results show that, when the level of market
tightness is low, the mean of the distribution of human capital is increasing with market
size, but only for small markets.
The model implies that the distribution of human capital in equilibrium is such
that the job finding probability of a worker with a given level of human capital is
independent of market size. That is, workers with the same rank have different
probabilities depending on the size of the market, but workers with the same level of
human capital do not.
Finally, the model also generates predictions with respect to the expected wage a
worker can earn. We find that when market tightness is low, workers obtain higher
returns to skill in bigger cities.
Related literature
Wheeler (2001), Bacolod et al. (2009) and Eeckhout et al. (2011) have documented the
allocation of skills across locations. Wheeler (2001), using county-level data from the
1990 Census of Population and Housing, estimates a negative relationship between the
percentage of population with low levels of education and population and a positive
relationship for the case of population with high levels of schooling, thus implying
that workers have higher levels of education in bigger cities. Bacolod et al. (2009) deal
with the effect of city size on the distribution of education and other kind of skills,
like intelligence or social skills, with data from the 1990 1% Census sample and the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. They find that the effect of city size on the
mean education of workers is larger than on the other measures of skills. Their work
also highlights that simplifying the level of skills to two levels might be too restrictive.
Although they do not find a strong effect of city size on the mean level of intelligence
and social skills, they do find that it affects the distribution, as larger cities accumulate
more people at the top and at the bottom of the distribution. Eeckhout et al. (2011)
findings also suggest that the distribution of skills in big cities have fatter tails. Using
the information from the Current Population Survey of 2009, when they measure skills
with years of education, they find a small positive correlation between city size and
average skills but a positive relation between city size and the standard deviation of
the skill measure.With respect to wages, both Wheeler (2001) and Bacolod et al. (2009)
find that the urban wage premium increases with worker education, so that the wages
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of the workers at the top of the skill distribution increase relative to the workers at the
low end of the distribution as market size increases.
There have been proposed different theories that can explain why big cities attract
skilled workers. Most of them are based on different kinds of agglomeration economies.
Resseger and Glaeser (2010) consider that cities foster the learning of skilled workers.
In Andersson et al. (2007), bigger markets provide with better assortative matching.
Hendricks (2011) relates the skill composition to the size of the business services
sector. At the country level, Redding and Schott (2003), propose that skilled-intensive
production has increasing returns to scale. Other theories are based on the idea that
only the most skilled can afford the tougher competition of bigger markets, as in Nocke
(2006) and Behrens et. al (2010). On the other hand, Eeckhout et al. (2011) explain the
higher inequality in skills in big cities through complementarities between the skills of
workers in the production function.
In contrast with the previous literature, in our model workers choose their level
of skills3. Instead of an exogenous distribution of skills and workers sorting across
locations, in our model workers remain in their location but can choose how much
human capital to accumulate.
Our model is also related with the literature that deals with the efficiency of
the matching function. One of the explanations for the existence of agglomeration
economies is that the matching process is more efficient in bigger cities (Duranton and
Puga 2004). This is consistent with the findings of Gan and Li (2004) for the market of
PhD. economists and the evidence in Bleakley and Lin (2012) on ocuppational switching.
Most of the empirical research find that the number of matches at the aggregate level
is a constant-returns-to-scale function of unemployment and vacancies (Petrongolo
and Pissarides 2001). However, Shimer (2007) shows that a mismatch model with a
matching function that features increasing returns to scale is also consistent with the
data.
The human capital investment decision in our model is closely related to Moen
(1999). His formulation does not require heterogeneity of the workers or firms in order
to find a non-degenerate distribution of skills. However, unlike us, he does not consider
a mismatch model of the labour market and the size of the market plays no role.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting. Section
3 considers the problem of the workers. In Section 4 we calculate the equilibrium. In
Section 5 we use the model to analyse the relationship between the size of the labour
market and the distribution of human capital. In Section 6 we consider the effect on
wages, and, finally, Section 7 concludes.
3.2 setting
We analyse an economy that lasts for one period in which we can identify 3 stages: In
the first stage a number of workers are born and vacancies are created. In the second
stage, each worker decides how much human capital to accumulate. Finally, workers
and vacancies go to the labour market in order to get matched and receive their payoffs.
We assume that the number of workers, U, and vacancies, V, is random: U follows a
uniform distribution with support [au, bu] and au > 0. V follows a uniform distribution
3 The exception is Redding and Schott (2003), where workers can choose to be either skilled or unskilled.
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with support [av, bv] and av > 0. We also assume that bu − au = bv − av = 2k > 0. The
distribution of workers and vacancies are independent.
Let U and V be the expectation of U and V respectively and let V = θU, where we
can interpret U as the size of the market and θ as market tightness. We can define the
parameters of the distributions of U and V as bu = U + k, bv = θU + k, au = U− k and
av = θU − k. In this way, the distributions of U and V depend on U and θ.
In the first stage, a realization of U and V, which we will denote u, and v, is drawn. A
continuum of workers are born and a continuum of vacancies are created. All workers
and vacancies are respectively identical. We assume that each firm has one vacancy,
so referring to a vacancy or a firm is equivalent. At this stage, workers do not know
which realization has taken place.
In the second stage, the decision problem of each worker consists in choosing a costly
level of human capital, h. Workers are risk neutral. The key assumption in this model
is that the workers do not know which realization has been drawn before entering the
market. This implies that when they decide how much human capital to accumulate
they do not know u and v . However, we assume that they know the distribution of
these two variables. If we think of education as one of the main factors to acquire
human capital, this assumption is reasonable. Individuals usually decide their level
of human capital at early stages in life, without knowing the exact conditions of the
labour market.
Each worker can accumulate a level of human capital h ∈ R+ at a cost C (h). The cost
function is twice continuous differentiable and satisfies C(0) = 0, C′(0) = 0, C′(h) > 0
for h > 0, and C′′(h) > 0. We also assume that for some h, C′(h) > 1.
After the investment decision has taken place, all workers and vacancies observe
u and v and enter the labour market in order to get matched. We assume perfect
competition in the labour market. The chances of getting matched for a worker will
depend on his level of human capital and on the realizations of U and V. If a vacancy
and a worker with a level of human capital equal to h match in the market, they
together produce h units of an homogeneous output. In this case, the payoff of the
worker will be w and the payoff of the firm will be pi = h− w. The price of the good
they produce is normalised to 1.
3.3 workers’ problem
In this section, we will deal with the workers’ problem. First, we will set the problem
they face at the third stage, when they enter the labour market. At that stage, the
level of skills of all workers are already determined and the realization of the random
variables are observed. We will derive which workers will be employed and at what
wages. In the second part of this section, we will describe how workers choose their
level of skills. We will assume that when workers take this decision, they have rational
expectations over the equilibrium wages of the labour market.
3.3.1 The labour market
When the agents enter the labour market, the level of skills of the workers is already de-
termined. Let F(h) denote the cumulative distribution of human capital in equilibrium.
3.3 workers’ problem 51
F (h) can also be considered as the ranking of the worker, with higher F (h) meaning
a higher ranking. Initially, we will assume that this distribution has a connected
support and that it is continuous with, possibly, a mass of workers at the minimum
and maximum of the support. We will denote the minimum level chosen hmin, the
maximum hmax and the mass of workers at these levels, f0 and f1 respectively.
There is perfect competition in the labour market. Firms seek to maximize their
profits and workers seek to maximize their wage. Shimer (2007) shows that, in this
case, the number of matches will equal min {u, v} and that firms employ the most
productive workers, that is, firms rank the workers according to their level of human
capital. This last result and continuity of the distribution of human capital imply that a
worker with a level of skills h0 will find a job if there are more vacancies than workers
with a higher level of skills than him, which can be expressed as (1− F(h0))u ≤ v. In
case there is a mass of workers at the extremes of the distribution, there are more cases
that we must take into account.4
Let hm (u, v) denote the level of skills of the worker with the lowest level of human
capital among those employed. The payoffs in equilibrium of a worker with level of
skills h ∈ (hmin, hmax), when there are u workers and v vacancies in the market, is
w (h, u, v) and is given by5:
w (h, u, v) =

h when v > u
h− hm (u, v) when (1− F (h)) u ≤ v ≤ u
0 when (1− F (h)) u > v
(20)
The function is derived in Appendix A.3.1. The payoff function states that if there is
an excess of jobs, v > u, workers’ wage is their productivity. However, if there is an
excess of workers, v ≤ u, then the wage of an employed worker is h− hm (u, v). If a
worker does not match any firm, he does not produce and receives 0.
3.3.2 Workers’ expected earnings
At the second stage of the period, workers choose their level of skills. Since they are
risk neutral, their problem is to choose the level of human capital that maximizes their
expected earnings, E (h).
The worker only knows the distributions from where u and v have been drawn.
Notice that the lack of information at the second stage of the process is the only source
4 In case there is a mass f1 of workers at the maximum of the support: If f1 < v, all workers with hmax find
a job. If v < f1, only vf1 of workers with hmax will find a job.
In case there is a mass f0 at the minimum of the support: If v > u, all workers with hmin find a job. If
(1− f0) u < v < u, only v−u(1− f0)f0 of workers with hmin will find a job. If v < (1− f0) u, none of workers
with hmin find a job.
5 In case there is a mass f1 of workers at the maximum of the support: If v > u, w (hmax, u, v) = hmax.
If f1 ≤ v, w (hmax, u, v) = hmax − hm (u, v). If v < f1, hm (u, v) = hmax and w (hmax, u, v) = 0 for the
employed and the unemployed.
In case there is a mass f0 at the minimum of the support: If v > u, w (hmin, u, v) = hmin. If (1− f0) u ≤
v ≤ u, hm (u, v) = hmin and w (hmin, u, v) = 0 for the employed and the unemployed. If v < (1− f0) u,
w (hmin, u, v) = 0.
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of friction in this economy. Once the agents go to the market, the matching process is
efficient, both in generating the maximum number of matches possible and in selecting
the most productive workers. We assume rational expectations over the equilibrium in
the labour market. The expected earnings, E (h), is a function of h defined as:
E (h) = E [w (h, U, V)]− C(h)
where E [·] is the expectation operator.
The expected payoff depends on the job finding probability of the worker. We will
next derive this probability and decompose it in such a way that we can calculate the
expected earnings. First of all, we will derive the probability that (1− F) u ≤ v, for
F ∈ [0, 1], since this is the job finding probability of a worker whose level of skills
belongs to the continuous part of the distribution. We will denote this probability by
P (F). In Appendix A.3.2 we show that P (F) is given by:
P (F) =

1 for bu−avbu < F ≤ 1 [1]
−2au(bv−av)(1−F)−a2v+bu(2bv−bu(1−F))(1−F)
2(1−F)(bu−au)(bv−av) for
au−av
au < F ≤ bu−avbu [2]
2bv−au(1−F)−bu(1−F)
2(bv−av) for
bu−bv
bu
< F ≤ au−avau [3]
(bv−ar(1−F))2
2(1−F)(bu−au)(bv−av) for
au−bv
au < F ≤ bu−bvbu [4]
0 for 0 ≤ F ≤ au−bvau [5]
(21)
This function is depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Probability function
P (F)
For bu = 120, au = 80, bv = 90, av = 50.
Lemma 1:
- P (F) is continuous and increasing in F.
- P (1) = 1.
- P (0) = 0 if bv ≤ au and P (0) > 0 otherwise.
Proof: Appendix A.3.3.
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Lemma 1 implies that P (F) can be expressed as:
P (F) = P (0) +
∫ F
0
∂P
(
F˜
)
∂F˜
dF˜
In the previous subsection we had defined f0 as the mass of workers with human
capital hmin. Therefore, we can rewrite P (F) as:
P (F) = P ( f0) +
∫ F
f0
∂P
(
F˜
)
∂F˜
dF˜ (22)
Equation 22 represents the job finding probability of a worker with h ∈ (hmin, hmax)
both in the case f0 > 0 and when f0 = 0.
As the worker’s problem is defined in terms of his level of human capital, and not
his ranking, we rewrite the job finding probability as a function of h, by defining
Ph (h) = P (F (h)) since P (F) and F (h) are increasing functions.
Therefore, Ph (h) can be represented as:
Ph (h) = P (F (h)) = P ( f0) +
∫ h
hmin
ph
(
h˜
)
dh˜
with
ph (h) =

∂P(F(h))
∂F(h)
∂F(h)
∂h for hmin < h < hmax
0 otherwise
Adding and subtracting P (0), we obtain:
Ph (h) = P (0) + (P ( f0)− P (0)) +
∫ h
hmin
ph
(
h˜
)
dh˜
According to this equation, Ph (h), can be calculated as the sum of three terms. The
first term is the probability that (1− F) u ≤ v for F = 0, which is the probability that
there is an excess of vacants. The second term is the probability that the workers with
hmin are the marginal workers. The third term is the integral of ph (h), which is the
density of h being the marginal worker. This is because Ph (h) is the probability that
(1− F (h)) u ≤ v, so ph (h) is the density of (1− F (h)) u = v.
Using this definition of the job finding probability allows as to calculate the expected
earnings of the worker as:
E (h) = P (0) h+(P ( f0)− P (0)) (h− hmin)+
∫ h
hmin
ph(h˜)(h− h˜)dh˜+(1− Ph (h)) (h− hmax) I (h > hmax)−C(h)
(23)
In this ecuation, I (h > hmax) is an indicator function equal to 1 when h > hmax. The
first term of the equation accounts for the salary when there is an excess of vacancies.
And the second to the forth term account for the case when there is an excess of
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workers for all possible values of the marginal worker. E (h) are the expected earnings
for any worker with h ≥ 0. We can check that is is true even for h ≤ hmin and h ≥ hmax.
We can consider first the case of hmin. If f0 = 0, the worker who chooses this level
of human capital will only find a job if u ≤ v and his payoff will be hmin. Therefore,
his expected earnings are P (0) hmin − C (hmin) which is equal to E (hmin). On the other
hand, if f0 > 0, when v is lower than u but greater than (1− f0) u, some workers with
hmin will find a job and some not, but all of them will have a payoff equal to 0, since the
marginal worker in this case is hmin. Therefore, also in this case, the expected earnings
are E (hmin), as equation 23 shows. Consider now the case of a worker that chooses
h1 < hmin. His job finding probability is P (0) and, in this case, his payoff will be h1.
Clearly, his expected earnings can be calculated making use of E (h).
We can deal now with the opposite case, a worker with h ≥ hmax. The argument is
the same as with the minimum of the support. Consider a worker that chooses hmax
and f1 > 0, then, equation 23 accounts for any case in which v > f1u. What happens if
v < f1u? Then, hmax is the marginal worker and has a payoff of 0. Thus, the expected
earnings of worker hmax can be calculated with E (h). However, a worker with h > hmax
would earn h− hmax in this case. This is accounted in the fourth term of the equation.
The decision problem of the worker is:
max
{h≥0}
{E (h)} (24)
Note that the worker takes F(h) and w (h, u, v) as given.
3.4 equilibrium
An equilibrium solution to the problem outlined above can be described by a tuple
(F (h) , w (h, u, v)) such that:
1. w (h, u, v) satisfies (20)
2. Workers solve (24)
3. F (h) satisfies E (h1) = E (h2) for ∀h1, h2 on the support of F (h) and E (h) < E (h1)
for ∀h that does not belong to the support.
The third point is due to the fact that, ex ante, all the individuals are equal. Thus, in
equilibrium they all must obtain the same expected earnings. For any h not chosen,
the expected earnings must be lower. Given that the support of F (h) is connected, this
third condition implies that the derivative of the expected earnings with respect to
human capital is zero for any h in the support of F (h):
∂E (h)
∂h
= 0
As we are dealing only with the cases in the support of F (h), the indicator function
is 0. We can rewrite E (h) in the following way
E (h) = P (0) h + (P ( f0)− P (0)) (h− hmin) + h
∫ h
hmin
ph(h˜)dh˜−
∫ h
hmin
ph(h˜)h˜dh˜− C(h)
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and take the derivative
∂E (h)
∂h
= P (0) + (P ( f0)− P (0)) +
∫ h
hmin
ph(h˜)dh˜ + hph(h)− ph(h)h− C′(h)
Notice that terms 4 and 5 account for the increment in the hiring probability, what it
is referred to as the rat race. However, at this point the worker is the marginal worker,
therefore, the gain from increasing the probability of finding a job is 0. This means that
in this setup the ranking of workers does not produce rat race in contrast with Moen
(1999). On the contrary, each worker chooses the optimal level of h given his hiring
probability. The derivative is simply:
∂E (h)
∂h
= P (0) + (P ( f0)− P (0)) +
∫ h
hmin
ph(h˜)dh˜− C′(h)
But
Ph (h) = P (0) + (P ( f0)− P (0)) +
∫ h
hmin
ph
(
h˜
)
dh˜
Therefore,
∂E (h)
∂h
= Ph (h)− C′(h) = P (F (h))− C′(h)
For the workers with a level of human capital h ∈ (hmin, hmax), Ph (h) is their job
finding probability and equal to P (F (h)). Therefore,
P (F (h)) = C′(h) (25)
This condition means that the marginal cost of acquiring an extra unit of human
capital must equal the marginal benefit, which is simply P(F). The individuals with
a higher ranking will enjoy a higher probability of finding a job, which increases
expected earnings. However, in equilibrium, all individuals must obtain the same
expected earnings. These expected earnings are equalised through the cost of obtaining
human capital. Compare two workers with different levels of human capital. One
worker has a higher position in the ranking than the other and a higher probability of
finding a job. How much more human capital than the other he has does not affect the
probability, since it only depends on the relative position in the ranking of each of them.
In order for the low skilled worker to be willing to remain low skilled, the high skilled
worker must accumulate a quantity of human capital such that the cost associated to it
makes the expected earnings of both workers equal. The following result shows that
equation 25 is also satisfied by the workers at the extrems of the distribution and that
the distribution that satisfies this equality is an equilibrium.
Proposition 1: An equilibrium of the model exists with the associated distribution
of human capital satisfying P (F (h)) = C′(h).
a) If bv ≥ au
- The distribution is continuous on [hmin, hmax)
56 human capital and market size
- There is a mass of workers at hmax equal to f1 = 1− (1−θ)U+2kU+k
b) If bv < au
- The distribution is continuous on (hmin, hmax)
- There is a mass of workers at hmax equal to f1 = 1− (1−θ)U+2kU+k
- There is a mass of workers at hmin equal to f0 =
(1−θ)U−2k
U−k
Proof: Appendix A.3.4.
Proposition 1 shows that the distribution of human capital only depends on the job
finding probability and the marginal cost. Furthermore, it always has a mass of workers
at the maximum of the support. This is because of the properties of the job finding
probability. In the following section, we will calculate and analyse the distribution that
arises from this model in equilibrium.
3.5 the effect of market size and market tightness
Let U and V be the expectation of U and V respectively and let V = θU. We can
interpret U as market size and θ as market tightness. If we redefine the parameters of
the distributions of U and V as bu = U + k, bv = θU + k, au = U − k and bv = θU − k,
we can derive P (F) as a function of market size,U , market tightness,θ , and ranking,
F. Given the equilibrium condition we have found, it is clear that analysing the effect
of these variables on the hiring probability will help us to understand their impact on
the distribution of human capital.
3.5.1 The hiring probability
We can calculate the hiring probability as a function of market size U, market tightness
θ, and the ranking of the workers F with 0 ≤ F ≤ 1:
P (F) =

1 for (1−θ)U+2k
U+k
< F ≤ 1 [1]
−(−4+4F+F2)k2+2(2−F)k(θ−(1−F))U−((θ−(1−F))U)2
8(1−F)k2 for
(1−θ)U
U−k < F ≤
(1−θ)U+2k
U+k
[2]
k+(θ−(1−F))U
2k for
(1−θ)U
U+k
< F ≤ (1−θ)U
U−k [3]
((−2+F)k+((1−F)−θ)U)2
8(1−F)k2 for
(1−θ)U−2k
U−k < F ≤
(1−θ)U
U+k
[4]
0 for 0 ≤ F ≤ (1−θ)U−2k
U−k [5]
We have seen that P (F) is the probability that (1− F (h))U ≤ V. In the literature,
it has been assumed that U and V are distributed according to independent Poisson
distributions, see Shimer (2007). We have used a uniform distribution because of its
simplicity, which is important when we introduce heterogeneity in human capital. The
length of the support of the distribution is constant for all U and V, which implies
that the variance of the distributions are unaffected by the size of the market. This
assumption implies that uncertainty decreases and the matching function becomes
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more efficient when market size increases. In Appendix A.3.5, we show that the
matching function associated to this probability is increasing and concave in U and V
and, for intermediate values of the market tightness, has increasing returns to scale.
The following two results consider the effect of market size and market tightness on
the job finding probability. The first of them states that the probability of finding a job
is increasing with market tightness, as expected.
Proposition 2: The job finding probability is increasing in market tightness for any
F < 1.
Proof: Appendix A.3.7.1.
Proposition 3: For the workers with ranking 1− θ < F < 1, the job finding proba-
bility is increasing with market size. For the workers with ranking F < 1− θ the job
finding probability is decreasing with market size. When the position in the ranking is
F = 1− θ the probability of finding a job is constant with market size.
Proof: Appendix A.3.7.2.
The last result states that the workers who have a higher position in the ranking,
have a greater hiring probability in bigger markets and the workers with a lower level
of skills have a lower probability. In Figure 7, P(F) is represented as a function of
F for different market sizes. We can check that for F > 1− θ = 0.3 the job finding
probability is increasing with market size. But for F < 0.3 the job finding probability
of the workers is lower when the size of the market increases. In addition, the three
functions cross at 1− θ = 0.3, thus, the probability of finding a job for the worker with
F = 0.3 is the same for all market sizes.
Figure 7: Probability and market size
P (F)
θ = 0.7 and k = 20
An implication of this result is that as the point at which the effect changes sign is
F = 1− θ, if θ > 1, all workers have F > 1− θ. Thus, all of them will have a higher
probability when the market is bigger. The lower is θ the higher the proportion of
workers who will have a lower probability in a bigger market.
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3.5.2 The effect of market size and market tightness on the distribution of human capital
In this section, we analyse how market size and market tightness affect the distribution
of human capital. It is important to notice that, as the workers at the top of the
distribution always find a job with probability 1, they choose the same level of human
capital for any market size and market tightness. This is stated in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: The maximum level of skills, hmax, is constant in market size and
market tightness.
Proof: From Proposition 1, we know that hmax is such that P (1) = C′ (hmax) and
from Lemma 1, we know that P (1) = 1.
Consider now an increase in market tightness, which we can interpret as an improve-
ment in the labour market conditions. This makes the marginal benefit of investing in
human capital, the job finding probability, also increase. Consequently, for any rank
below the top, workers find optimal to invest more in human capital. In particular, the
workers at the bottom will invest a higher level, that is, hmin is increasing in market
tightness. This implies that the proportion of workers at the lower part of the distri-
bution decreases and the distribution of human capital concentrates in the maximum
level. The effect on the cumulative distribution is Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: F (h) is decreasing in θ for hmin ≤ h < hmax.
Proof: A.3.7.3
An implication of this result is that f0 decreases with market tightness and f1 in-
creases. In fact, for a high enough level of market tightness, θ > 1 + 2k
U
, the whole
population chooses hmax. This last situation corresponds to the case when the probabil-
ity that V > U is one.
We can consider now the size of the market. The effect of market size on the
distribution is also driven by the effect on the job finding probability. If market size
increases, the probability of those workers with rank below 1− θ decreases. This means
that the marginal benefit of investing in human capital is lower. Thus, their level of
investment will be lower. This implies that for F < 1− θ, the proportion of workers at
the lower part of the distribution increases and the minimum level invested, hmin, also
decreases. F (h) is increasing in U on this range. On the contrary, for the workers with
rank above 1− θ, the job finding probability increases with market size and also the
level invested in human capital. For this range of the distribution, workers concentrate
to the top of the distribution, and F (h)is decreasing in U.
If we consider the effect on the entire distribution, we must take into account whether
θ is greater or less than 1. If θ > 1, all workers have rank above 1− θ. As market
size increases, the whole population concentrates in the maximum level, f1 tends
to 1. If θ < 1, the distribution concentrates to the extremes. In this case, the limit
of the distribution when market size tends to infinity is that θ workers choose the
maximum level of human capital. The other workers do not invest at all. Proposition 6
summarizes the effects of market size on the distribution.
Proposition 6: Let h0 be such that F (h0) = 1− θ. Then:
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a. F (h) is increasing in U for h < h0, decreasing in U for h0 < h < hmax and constant
for h0.
b. f0 tends to 1− θ if θ < 1 and to 0 if θ ≥ 1 as U tends to infinity.
c. f1 tends to θ if θ < 1 and to 1 if θ ≥ 1 as U tends to infinity.
Proof: Appendix A.3.7.4.
The findings about the distribution suggest that a higher size of the market implies a
more unequal distribution, where the skilled workers have a higher level of human
capital and the unskilled workers have a lower level of human capital, compared to
smaller labour markets. The effect on the mean of the distribution can be calculated
with numerical examples. Let C (h) = 12 h
2 and k = 25. In table 14, we have the mean
for different values of U and θ.
Table 14: Mean value of human capital
U = 50 U = 100 U = 200 U = 500
θ = 0.6 E [h] 0.602 0.612 0.603 0.601
hmin 0.18 0.02 0 0
hmax 1 1 1 1
f0 0 0 0.17 0.32
f1 0.07 0.28 0.42 0.52
θ = 0.8 E [h] 0.751 0.795 0.804 0.801
hmin 0.32 0.18 0.02 0
hmax 1 1 1 1
f0 0 0 0 0.1
f1 0.2 0.44 0.6 0.71
According to the table, the mean level of human capital is increasing with market
size until hmin = 0. Then, it decreases as it tends to f1hmax = θhmax. As we had
found analytically, hmin is decreasing whereas hmax is unaffected by market size. The
distribution under these parameters is represented in Figure 8 and the density functions
associated to these distributions are in Figure 9.
3.6 the effect of market size on wages
We can analyse the effect of market size on the expected wage. Let E [w (h, U, V) | job]
be the expected payoffs of a worker with human capital h, conditional on finding a job.
E [w (h, U, V) | job] = E [w (h, U, V)]
P (F (h))
E [w (h, U, V)] can be derived from the equilibrium condition that equalises the
expected earnings of all workers. We use the expected earnings of the worker at the
bottom because of its simplicity.
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Figure 8: Distribution of human capital
Figure 9: Density functions
E (h) = E [w (h, U, V)]− C(h) = E (hmin) = P (0) hmin − C (hmin)
The expected wage is:
E [w (h, U, V) | job] = C(h) + E (hmin)
P (F (h))
To calculate the effect of market size on the expected wage, we need to know what is
the effect on the expected earnings of the worker at the minimum of the distribution.
It is:
∂E (hmin)
∂U
=
∂P (0)
∂U
hmin
On the other hand, we also need to know what is the effect of market size on
the job finding probability of a worker with level of human capital h. We can use
the equilibrium condition P (F (h)) = C′ (h). As the job finding probability must be
equal to the marginal cost in equilibrium, we see that market size does not affect the
job finding probability of the worker who chooses a level of human capital h. The
ranking of this worker will change so that the probability still equals the marginal cost.
Therefore, the expected wage can be represented as:
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E [w (h, U, V) | job] = C(h) + E (hmin)
C′ (h)
The derivative with respect to market size is:
∂E [w (h, U, V) | job]
∂U
=
(
1
C′ (h)
)
∂E [w (h, U, V)]
∂U
=
(
1
C′ (h)
)
∂E (hmin)
∂U
Therefore, the effect on the expected wage is:
∂E [w (h, U, V) | job]
∂U
=
(
1
C′ (h)
)
∂P (0)
∂U
hmin
The derivative is negative for 1− 2k
U
< θ < 1, positive for 1 < θ < 1 + 2k
U
and 0
otherwise. Therefore, in the cases where market size affects the expected wages, we see
that the effect depends on market tightness again. When the labour market is tight, the
expected wage is higher in bigger markets and the opposite occurs for market tightness
lower than 1.
This is a consequence of the wage setting. When the market is tight, there is a higher
probability that there is an excess of jobs, and workers receive higher salaries. As
market size increases, the probability of this event is higher, therefore, the expected
wages increase. This positive effect is decreasing with the level of skills of the worker.
On the other hand, when market tightness is low, there is a high probability that
there is an excess of workers in the market. If this is the case, the wage of the workers
will be lower, since the wage will be their productivity minus the productivity of the
marginal worker. However, this negative effect is decreasing with the level of skills of
the worker. This is an implication of the equilibrium condition. The expected earnings
must be the same for all workers. As market size increases, the expected earnings of
the worker at the bottom decreases. Therefore, the expected payoffs of all workers
must decrease in the same quantity. As the job finding probability of a worker with
low rank is small, the expected wage must decrease more in order to obtain the same
reduction in the expected payoff. This implies that we can explain higher returns to
skill in bigger cities through gains in matching efficiency when market tightness is
lower than 1.
3.7 conclusions
In this paper, we have explored the implications of city size on the incentives to invest
on human capital. To this end, we have developed a model in which workers’ chances
of getting a job depend on the size of the market and their relative position in the
distribution of skills. The results of this model are consistent with the hypothesis
that investment in human capital increases with market size. However, when market
tightness is low, the mass of workers with the lowest level of human capital increases
with market size even when the mean level of human capital is higher.
Another implication of the results is that market size can affect the distribution of
human capital even in situations when the aggregate matching function has constant
returns to scale. Even in this case, market size affects the hiring probability of the
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workers, increasing their chances for those at the top of the distribution and decreasing
the chances for those at the bottom.
A
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a.1.1 Continuation value
The continuation value if both spouses are unemployed is:
W˜ (h, a, z, z) = α2i W˜i (h, a, z, z) + αi (1− αi) W˜im (h, a, z, z)
+αi (1− αi) W˜i f (h, a, z, z) + (1− αi)2 W˜i0 (h, a, z, z)
Where the first term accounts for the case that both spouses receive an inside offer,
the second term is for the case when only the husband receives an inside offer, the third
term is for the wife being the only one and the last term accounts for the case when
neither of them receives an inside offer. Each of these values, at the same time will
be an expectation over the probabilities of receiving outside offers. They are specified
below.
If both receive an inside offer:
W˜i (h, a, z, z) = max
{
W
(
h, 0, a, wm, w f
)
, W (h, 0, a, wm, z) , W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f
)}
If only the husband receives an inside offer:
W˜im (h, a, z, z) = α2omax
{
W
(
h, 1, a, wm, w f
)
, W (h, 0, a, wm, z) , W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f
)}
+αo (1− αo)max
{
W (h, 0, a, wm, z) , W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f
)}
+(1− αo)W (h, 0, a, wm, z)
If only the wife receive an inside offer:
W˜i f (h, a, z, z) = α2omax
{
W
(
h, 1, a, wm, w f
)
, W (h, 1, a, wm, z) , W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f
)}
+αo (1− αo)max
{
W (h, 1, a, wm, z) , W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f
)}
+(1− αo)W
(
h, 0, a, z, w f
)
If neither receive and inside offer:
W˜i0 (h, a, z, z) = α2omax
{
W
(
h, 1, a, wm, w f
)
, W (h, 1, a, wm, z) , W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f
)
, W (h, 0, a, z, z)
}
+αo (1− αo)max {W (h, 1, a, wm, z) , W (h, 0, a, z, z)}
+αo (1− αo)max
{
W
(
h, 1, a, z, w f
)
, W (h, 0, a, z, z)
}
+ (1− αo)2 W (h, 0, a, z, z)
a.1.2 Distribution of unemployed workers
The density of workers that the firm may hire can be obtained from the density of
workers that are unemployed and the conditional density that these workers will
be employed in the following period. Let ψˆ =
(
j, c, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
be the state of a
worker that is j ∈ {m, f }, and belong to a couple that live in location c ∈ {l, n},
the previous period had tenure h, with migration status g, level of assets a, and
employment status pm, p f . Also let λ
(
ψˆ
)
be the density of workers and Q
(
ψˆ′ | ψˆ) be
the conditional density that a worker that is ψˆ becomes ψˆ′. The quantity of workers in
state ψˆ0 =
(
j0, c0, h0, g0, a0, pm0, p f 0
)
that are employed and in the previous period were
unemployed is:
λˆhire
(
ψˆ0
)
=
∫
Ψˆ
I
(
pj = z
)
I
(
pj0 6= z
)
Q
(
ψˆ0 | ψˆ
)
λ
(
ψˆ
)
dψˆ
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with Ψˆ = {m, f } x {l, n} x
{
0, h
}
x {0, 1} xAxPxP.
The number of matches in location c = c0 is:
Mc0 =
∫
Ψ
I (c = c0) λˆhire
(
ψˆ
)
dψˆ
Therefore, the density of unemployed workers that a firm established in location
c = c0 may hire is:
λhire
(
j, c0, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
=
λˆhire
(
j, c0, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
Mc0
Moreover, the hiring probability in c is the number of hirings in c divided by the
vacancy rate in that location.
αcr =
Mc
vc
In subsection 1.2.7.3, we abstract away from locational notation and write λhire
(
j, c, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
=
λhire
(
j, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
and αcr = αr.
a.1.3 Computation of the equilibrium
We define q = a + (1− χ) h. Therefore, the household problem can be rewritten as:
W
(
h, g, q, pm, p f
)
= max
cm ,c f ,q′ ,h′∈{0,h}
{
ϑu (cm) + (1− ϑ) u
(
c f
)
+ βW˜
(
h′, q′, pm, p f
)}
st cm + c f + q
′ − (1− χ) h′ + r f h + (φb + 1) h′ Ih=0 = inc +
(
r f − δh
)
(1− τir) h′ + (1− φs) hIh′=0 if g=0
cm + c f + q
′ − (1− χ) h′ + r f h + (φb + 1) h′ = inc +
(
r f − δh
)
(1− τir) h′ + (1− φs) h if g=1
q′ ≥ 0 (1c)
with inc =
(
1− τ Ipm 6=z
)
pm +
(
1− τ Ip f 6=z
)
p f + (1+ i (1− τ)) (q− (1− χ) h).
Similarly, the problem of the firm is defined on q.
We compute the equilibrium with the following steps:
1. We use a discrete grid on the variable q, and on the payoffs pj.
2. We guess market tightness θ and the wage function wj
(
h, g, q, w−j
)
.
3. We solve the household’s problem by value function iteration.
4. We calculate the invariant densities, λ
(
ψ˜
)
and λhire
(
ψ˜
)
.
5. We compute the value of a filled job by value function iteration using the fact that
in equilibrium V = 0.
6. We calculate the new wage function from Nash bargaining, using the value
functions found in step 4 and 6. We update our guess for the wage function as a linear
combination of the new wage and the old guess.
7. We compute the value of a vacant job, we raise our guess of θ if the value is
positive and decrease it if it is negative.
8. We repeat this procedure from step 2 until convergence.
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a.1.4 Single-Agent model
The economy is populated by a measure 1 of infinitely lived workers. Each worker
constitues a household. W (h, g, a, p) is the value of a worker that in the previous
period had housing tenure h and that in this period has migration status g, level of
assets a, labour payoff p. The problem of the household in stage 4 is the following:
W (h, g, a, p) = max
c,a′ ,h′∈{0,h}
{
ϑu (cm) + (1− ϑ) u
(
c f
)
+ βW˜
(
h′, a′, p
)}
(26)
st c + a′ + r f h + (φb + 1) h′ Ih=0 = inc +
(
r f − δh
)
(1− τir) h′ + (1− φs) hIh′=0 if g=0
c + a′ + r f h + (φb + 1) h′ = inc +
(
r f − δh
)
(1− τir) h′ + (1− φs) h if g=1
a′ ≥ − (1− χ) h′
with inc =
(
1− τ Ip 6=z
)
p + (1+ i (1− τ)) a.
The continuation value of an employed worker is W˜ (h, a, w) with:
W˜ (h, a, w) = (1− s)W (h, 0, a, w) + sW (h, 0, a, z)
The continuation value of an unemployed worker is W˜ (h, a, z) with:
W˜ (h, a, z) = αiαomax {W (h, 1, a, w (h, 1, a)) , W (h, 0, a, z) , W (h, 0, a, w (h, 0, a))}
+ αi (1− αo)W (h, 0, a, w (h, 0, a))
+ (1− αi) αomax {W (h, 1, a, w (h, 1, a)) , W (h, 0, a, z)}
+ (1− αi) (1− αo)W (h, 0, a, z)
In the Single-Agent model a worker never quits his job. Therefore, the value of a
filled job that pays wage w is:
J (w) =
(1+ i) (y− w) + sV
i + sep
(27)
Let λhire
(
ψ˜
)
be the density of the unemployed workers that a firm can hire with
ψ˜ = (h, g, a, p). Then, the value of a vacant job is:
V = −ξ + αr
1+ i
∫
Ψ
J
(
ψ˜
)
λhire
(
ψ˜
)
dψ˜ (28)
with Ψ =
{
0, h
}
x {0, 1} xAxP.
The wage is determined by Nash bargaining. w (h, g, a) is the solution to:
max
w
(W (h, g, a, w)−W (h, 0, a, z))γ (J (w)−V)1−γ (29)
Leasing companies solve the same problem as in the benchmark model. Therefore,
the price for renting a house satisfies:
r f =
i
1+ i
+ δh (30)
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A steady-state equilibrium for a given set of policy arrangements {τ, τir}consists
of a set of value functions {W (ψ) , J (j,ψ)} , a set of decision rules {ga (ψ) , gh (ψ)}, a
time-invariant measure of agent types λ
(
ψ˜
)
, a set of prices{
r f , wj (h, g, a, ·)
}
, and market tightness θ such that:
1. Given prices, θ and the fiscal policy, the household’s decision rules solve the
dynamic program given by (26).
2. Given prices and the household’s decision rules, the firm solves (27).
3. θ satisfies V = 0 with V given by (28).
4. Wages satisfy (29) and the rent satisfies (30).
5. λ
(
ψ˜
)
is the invariant distribution generated by the meeting probability, separation
rate and the household’s decision rules.
Table 15: Estimated parameters in the Single-Agent model
Parameter Target Source
β = 0.9960 home ownership rate= 66% CPS 1980-2005
s = 0.030 unemployment rate= 6.2% CPS 1980-2005
k = 0.53 job finding rate= 0.42 Shimer 1980-2005
z = 0.94 z = 40% mean wage Shimer 2005
h = 73 house/earnings= 29 AHS 1989-2005
ε = 0.26 annual migration rate= 2.4% CPS 1999-2005
φs = φb = 0.035 migration rate owners/renters= 33% SIPP 2001
Table 16: Calibration targets in the Single-Agent model
Moment Data Model
home-ownership rate 66% 65%
unemployment rate 6.2% 6.5%
job finding rate 0.42 0.44
unemp. flow/wage 40% 39%
house/earnings 29 28
annual migration rate 2.4% 2.5%
migration rate owners/renters 33% 35%
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a.2.1 Continuation value
The continuation value if both spouses are unemployed is:
W˜ (a, z, z) = αmi α
f
i W˜i (a, z, z) + α
m
i
(
1− α fi
)
W˜im (a, z, z)
+α
f
i
(
1− αmi
)
W˜i f (a, z, z) +
(
1− αmi
) (
1− α fi
)
W˜i0 (a, z, z)
Where the first term accounts for the case that both spouses meet an inside vacancy,
the second term is for the case when only the husband meets an inside vacancy, the
third term is for the wife being the only one and the last term accounts for the case
when neither of them meets an inside vacancy. Each of these values, at the same time
will be an expectation over the probabilities of meeting outside vacancies. They are
specified below.
If both meet an inside vacancy:
W˜i (a, z, z) = max
{
W
(
a, wm, w f
)
, W (a, wm, z) , W
(
a, z, w f
)}
If only the husband meets an inside vacancy:
W˜im (a, z, z) = αmo α
f
o max
{
W
(
a, wm, w f
)
, W (a, wm, z) , W
(
a, z, w f
)}
+α
f
o (1− αmo )max
{
W (a, wm, z) , W
(
a, z, w f
)}
+
(
1− α fo
)
W (a, wm, z)
If only the wife meets an inside vacancy:
W˜i f (a, z, z) = αmo α
f
o max
{
W
(
a, wm, w f
)
, W (a, wm, z) , W
(
a, z, w f
)}
+αmo
(
1− α fo
)
max
{
W (a, wm, z) , W
(
a, z, w f
)}
+ (1− αmo )W
(
a, z, w f
)
If neither meets an inside vacancy:
W˜i0 (a, z, z) = αmo α
f
o max
{
W
(
a, wm, w f
)
, W (a, wm, z) , W
(
a, z, w f
)
, W (a, z, z)
}
+αmo
(
1− α fo
)
max {W (a, wm, z) , W (a, z, z)}
+α
f
o (1− αmo )max
{
W
(
a, z, w f
)
, W (a, z, z)
}
+ (1− αmo )
(
1− α fo
)
W (a, z, z)
a.2.2 Distribution of unemployed workers
The density of workers that the firm may hire can be obtained from the density of
workers that are unemployed and the conditional density that these workers will be
employed in the following period. Let ψˆ =
(
j, c, g, a, pm, p f
)
be the state of a worker
that is j ∈ {m, f }, live in location c ∈ {l, n}, in a couple with migration status g,
financial assets a, and employment status pm and p f . Also let λ
(
ψˆ
)
be the density of
workers and Q
(
ψˆ′ | ψˆ) be the conditional density that a worker that is ψˆ becomes ψˆ′.
The quantity of workers in state ψˆ0 =
(
j0, c0, g0, a0, pm0, p f 0
)
that are employed and in
the previous period were unemployed is:
λˆhire
(
ψˆ0
)
=
∫
Ψˆ
I
(
pj = z
)
I
(
pj0 6= z
)
Q
(
ψˆ0 | ψˆ
)
λ
(
ψˆ
)
dψˆ
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with Ψˆ = {m, f } x {l, n} x
{
0, h
}
x {0, 1} xAxPxP.
The number of matches in location c = c0 and labour market j = j0:
Mj0c0 =
∫
Ψ
I (c = c0) I (j = j0) λˆhire
(
ψˆ
)
dψˆ
Therefore, the density of unemployed workers that a firm in location c = c0 and in
labour market j = j0 may hire is:
λhire
(
j0, c0, g, a, pm, p f
)
=
λˆhire
(
j0, c0, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
Mj0c0
Moreover, the hiring probability is the number of hirings divided by the vacancy
rate.
α
j,c
r =
Mjc
vjc
In subsection 1.2.7.3, we abstract away from locational notation and write λhire
(
j, c, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
=
λhire
(
j, h, g, a, pm, p f
)
and αcr = αr.
70 appendix
a.3 chapter 3
a.3.1 Wages
a) The number of matchings will equal min {u, v}.
The reason is that if the number of matchings is less than min {u, v}, there are
workers and vacancies unmatched. Firms are willing to employ a worker as long as
profits pi (u, v) = h− w (h, u, v) ≥ 0, and workers are willing to be employed as long
as w (h, u, v) ≥ 0. We can see that there is no salary in which neither of them wants to
get matched and salaries in which only one wants to get match are not an equilibrium.
b) When v > u, the salary paid is w (h, u, v) = h and pi (u, v) = 0.
If the salary were w′ (h, u, v) < h, profits would be pi′ (u, v) > 0 for a matched firm
and pi′ (u, v) = 0 for a firm that does not get matched. Therefore, an unmatched firm
would be strictly better off being matched while it is not, which is not possible in
equilibrium. On the other hand, if w′ (h, u, v) > h, profits would be strictly lower for a
matched firm, which cannot be an equilibrium, either.
c) If v ≤ u, the workers with higher human capital are employed.
Assume the contrary, then there is some h′ not employed such that h′ > h and h is
employed. This implies pi (h′, u, v) ≤ pi (h, u, v), thus w (h′, u, v) ≥ h′− h+w (h, u, v) >
0 but in this case h′ strictly prefers to be employed while it is not. This cannot be an
equilibrium.
d) w (hm, u, v) = 0
As hm is the employed worker with lowe ranking, pi (hm, u, v) ≥ pi (h, u, v) for
hm > h, thus w (hm, u, v) ≤ hm − h + w (h, u, v). But in equilibrium, unemployed
workers do not prefer to be employed, thus their offered salary is 0, which means
that w (hm, u, v) ≤ hm − h, for any h unemployed, therefore, it is enough to consider
the highest h in the market among the unemployed. As the supprt is connected, this
means that w (hm, u, v) ≤ 0. On the other hand, for the marginal worker to prefer to be
employed we need that w (hm, u, v) ≥ 0.
e) If v ≤ u, the salary paid to an employed worker is w (h, u, v) = h− hm.
All firms get matched, in equilibrium it must be that pi (h′, u, v) = pi (h, u, v), hence
w (h′, u, v) = h′ − h + w (h, u, v). In particulaer, we will have that w (h′, u, v) = h′ −
hm + w (hm, u, v) = h′ − hm.
a.3.2 Calculation of P (F)
P (F) is the probability that (1− F) u ≤ v for F ∈ [0, 1]. Let r = (1− F) u, r is the
realization of the random variable R. We are interested in the probability that r ≤ v.
We know that U follows a uniform distribution with support [au, bu]. Then, the
distribution function of U is:
FU (u) =
u− au
bu − au
Since R is a monotone function of U, its distribution function is:
A.3 chapter 3 71
FF (r) = FU
(
r
(1− F)
)
=
r/ (1− F)− au
bu − au
R follows a uniform distribution with support [ar, br], with ar = (1− F) au and
br = (1− F) bu. To compute the probability that r ≤ v, we need to consider all the
possible combinations in the positions of the supports of FF (r) and FV (v).
Condition 1. ar < br < av < bv:
If (1− F) is small it could be that the support of FR (r) were on the left of the support
of FV (v). In this case, R ≤ V for any possible realization, therefore the probability that
r ≤ v will be 1. The condition br < av implies (1− F) bu < av, that we can rewrite as
F > bu−avbu .
P(F) = 1 if F >
bu − av
bu
Condition 2. ar < av ≤ br < bv
If ar < av ≤ br < bv, the probability that r ≤ v can be calculated as the sum of the
probability of three different events: the probability that r lies between ar and av, the
probability that v lies between br and bv and the probability that both r and v lie between
av and br, in this circumstance we only have to take into account the realizations where
r ≤ v. The intersection of the first two events has a positive probability.
Below we have the probability in this case. The three terms are respectively the
probabilities of the three events.
P(F) =
∫ av
ar
∫ bv
av
1
(bv − av)(br − ar) dvdr+
∫ bv
br
∫ br
av
1
(bv − av)(br − ar) drdv+
∫ br
av
∫ v
av
1
(bv − av)(br − ar) drdv
The conditions br ≥ av and av > ar imply (1− F) bu ≥ av and av > (1− F) au.
Therefore, F must be such that au−avau < F ≤ bu−avbu . If we calculate the integrals:
P(F) =
−2au (bv − av) (1− F)− a2v + bu (2bv − bu (1− F)) (1− F)
2 (1− F) (bu − au) (bv − av) for
au − av
au
< F ≤ bu − av
bu
Condition 3. av ≤ ar < br < bv
Since the support of FV (v) is larger than the support of FR (r), there is also the
possibility that av ≤ ar < br < bv. In this case, the probability that r ≤ v is the sum
of the probability that v lies between br and bv plus the probability that both r and
v lie between ar and br, in this circumstance we only have to take into account the
realizations where r ≤ v.
P(F) =
∫ bv
br
∫ br
ar
1
(bv − av)(br − ar)drdv +
∫ br
ar
∫ v
ar
1
(bv − av)(br − ar)drdv
The conditions br < bv and av ≤ ar imply bu (1− F) < bv and av ≤ (1− F) au.
Therefore, F must be such that bu−bvbu < F ≤ au−avau . We obtain that:
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P(F) =
2bv − au (1− F)− bu (1− F)
2 (bv − av) for
bu − bv
bu
< F ≤ au − av
au
Condition 4. av < ar < bv ≤ br
For (1− F) closer to 1, it could be that av < ar < bv ≤ br. In this case, when v lies
between av and ar, r cannot be smaller than v. The same happens when r lies between
bv and br. There is only one event that we need to take into account, when r and v lie
between ar and bv and r ≤ v.
P(F) =
∫ bv
ar
∫ v
ar
1
(bv − av)(br − ar)drdv
The conditions bv ≤ br and ar < bv imply bv ≤ (1− F) bu and (1− F) au < bv.
Therefore, in this case it must be that au−bvau < F ≤ bu−bvbu .
P(F) =
(bv − ar (1− F))2
2 (1− F) (bu − au) (bv − av) for
au − bv
au
< F ≤ bu − bv
bu
Condition 5. av < bv ≤ ar < br:
Finally, if av < bv ≤ ar < br, the probability that R ≤ V is 0. The condition ar ≥ bv
implies (1− F) au ≥ bv. Therefore, au−bvau ≥ F.
Taking into account the 5 conditions, the probability that (1− F)U ≤ V is the
following piecewise function:
P (F) =

1 for bu−avbu < F ≤ 1 [1]
−2au(bv−av)(1−F)−a2v+bu(2bv−bu(1−F))(1−F)
2(1−F)(bu−au)(bv−av) for
au−av
au < F ≤ bu−avbu [2]
2bv−au(1−F)−bu(1−F)
2(bv−av) for
bu−bv
bu
< F ≤ au−avau [3]
(bv−ar(1−F))2
2(1−F)(bu−au)(bv−av) for
au−bv
au < F ≤ bu−bvbu [4]
0 for 0 ≤ F ≤ au−bvau [5]
(21)
a.3.3 Characterization of P (F)
The derivative of P (F) is:
∂P(F)
∂F
=

0 for bu−avbu < F ≤ 1
b2u(1−F)2−a2v
2(1−F)2(bu−au)(bv−av) for
au−av
au < F ≤ bu−avbu
au+bu
2(bv−av) for
bu−bv
bu
< F ≤ au−avau
b2v(1−F)2−a2u(1−F)2
2(1−F)2(bu−au)(bv−av) for
au−bv
au < F ≤ bu−bvbu
0 for 0 ≤ F ≤ au−bvau
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Therefore, P (F) is increasing in F and strictly increasing in F for au−bvau < F <
bu−av
bu .
Depending on the parameters, some of the conditions on F that define the probability
function are not part of the domain [0, 1]. Given the assumptions in the setting, there
are 4 possible cases: the support of V can be either at the right or at the left of the
support of U and they may intersect or not. We derive next, what intervals used for
the definition of P (F) apply, for each of the 4 cases.
Case 1. au < bu ≤ av < bv
In this case the support of U is to the left of the support of V. We also know that the
support of R is to the left of the support of U for any rank of the worker. Then, it is
clear that the support of R will also be to the left of the support of V for any F. This is
the same as saying that, if with probability 1 there are more vacancies than workers,
then also with probability 1 there are more vacancies than some proportion of workers.
Analytically, it implies that the intervals 2 to 5 used to define P (F) do not belong to
the domain of the function. In fact, we can check that the range of these intervals is
negative, as their superior limit is F < bu−avbu . Therefore, in this case the job finding
probability can be defined as:
P (F) = 1 for 0 ≤ F ≤ 1
Case 2. au < av < bu < bv
In this case, the support of U is to the left of the support of V but they intersect.
Following the same argument as in the previous case, we can check that only intervals
1 to 3 belong to the domain of P (F), as in these 3 cases br < bv. Analytically, we can
check that the range of conditions 4 and 5 is negative, since the maximum of these
restrictions is bu−bvbu < 0. In this case, the job finding probability can be defined as:
P (F) =

1 for bu−avbu < F ≤ 1 [1]
−2au(bv−av)(1−F)−a2v+bu(2bv−bu(1−F))(1−F)
2(1−F)(bu−au)(bv−av) for
au−av
au < F ≤ bu−avbu [2]
2bv−au(1−F)−bu(1−F)
2(bv−av) for 0 ≤ F ≤
au−av
au [3]
Case 3. av ≤ au < bv ≤ bu
In this case, the support of U is to the right of the support of V but they intersect.
This means that for some F the support of R will also be to the right of V, so condition
4 applies. Clearly, conditions 1 to 3 also apply for F high enough. We can check that
restriction 5 does not apply. Its maximum is bu−bvbu = 0 . The job finding probability in
this case is given by:
P (F) =

1 for bu−avbu ≤ F ≤ 1 [1]
−2au(bv−av)(1−F)−a2v+bu(2bv−bu(1−F))(1−F)
2(1−F)(bu−au)(bv−av) for
au−av
au < F <
bu−av
bu [2]
2bv−au(1−F)−bu(1−F)
2(bv−av) for
bu−bv
bu
< F ≤ au−avau [3]
(bv−ar(1−F))2
2(1−F)(bu−au)(bv−av) for 0 ≤ F ≤
bu−bv
bu [4]
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Case 4. av < bv ≤ au < bu
In this case the support of U is to the right of the support of V. With probability 1
there will be more workers and vacancies. Therefore, the workers with the lowest rank
will not find a job. All 5 conditions apply. And the job finding probability is given by
equation 21.
Notice that condition 1 always applies for workers with F high enough. As we
have assumed av > 0, P (1) = 1, for any position of the supports. On the other hand,
condition 5 only applies in case 4. This means that when bv > au, P (0) > 0.
a.3.4 Equilibrium
We will follow the steps below for case a and case b.
Step 1. F (h) is continuous on the domain established.
Step 2. The minimum of the support is hmin and satisfies P (F (hmin)) = C′ (hmin).
Step 3. The maximum of the support is hmax and satisfies P (F (hmax)) = C′ (hmax).
Step 4. This equilibrium exist.
a) If bv ≥ au:
Step 1. In Appendix A.3.3, it is shown that P (F) is strictly increasing for 0 ≤
F < 1− f1. Therefore, F (h) that satisfies P (F (h)) = C′(h) is a continuous distribution
on [hmin, hmax). In section ??, we have shown that it implies that E (h1) = E (h2) for any
h1, h2 ∈ (hmin, hmax).
Step 2. If the distribution of human capital is continuous on [hmin, hmax),
then, the job finding probability for workers at hmin is P (0). We have to show that
E (hmin) > E (h) for any h < hmin, keeping the ranking fixed. The expected earnings
of the worker at the minimum of the support are E (h) = P (0) h − C (h). Since
E ′ (h) = P (0)−C′ (h) and E ′′ (h) = −C′′ (h) < 0, we see that this condition is satisfied.
Step 3.The maximum of the support is hmax and satisfies P (F (hmax)) =
C′ (hmax). If the distribution of human capital is continuous on [hmin, hmax), then the
job finding probability for workers at hmax is P (1), as firms can rank workers above
and below F = 1− f1 and the probability that v ≥ f1 is 1.1 We have to show that
E (hmax) > E (h) for any h1 > hmax. The expected earnings of a worker with h1 > hmax
is: 2
E (h1) = P (0) h1 +(P ( f0)− P (0)) (h1 − hmin)+
∫ h1
hmin
ph(h˜)(h− h˜)dh˜+(1− Ph (h1)) (h1 − hmax) I (h1 > hmax)−C(h1)
But the fourth term is 0 since Ph (h1) = 1. Then,
1 Firms can rank workers above and below 1− f1
2 Remember that P (F) was well calculated even if the f1 workers at the top are not continuously distributed,
therefore, equation_ is correctly specified. Even if they choose h > hmax the highest level of skills of the
marginal worker is the level of skills of the worker with rank just below F1.
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E (h1) = P (0) h1 + (P ( f0)− P (0)) (h1 − hmin) +
∫ h1
hmin
ph(h˜)(h− h˜)dh˜− C(h1)
The difference in expected earnings, keeping the ranking fixed, are:
E (h1)− E (hmax) = P (0) (h1 − hmax) + (P ( f0)− P (0)) (h1 − hmin − hmax + hmin)
+
∫ hmax
hmin
ph(h˜)(h1 − h˜− hmax + h˜)dh˜− C(h1) + C(hmax)
This equation simplifies to:
E (h1)− E (hmax) = (h1 − hmax)
(
P ( f0) +
∫ hmax
hmin
ph(h˜)dh˜
)
− C(h1) + C(hmax)
Using that P ( f0) +
∫ hmax
hmin
ph(h˜)dh˜ = 1, we obtain:
E (h)− E (hmax) = (h− hmax) 1− C(h) + C(hmax)
Therefore,E (h)− E (hmax) is negative since C′ (hmax) = 1 and C (h) is convex.
Step 4. The LHS of P (F (h)) = C′(h) can range from 0 to 1. Since C′(h) is
assumed to be continuous and ranges from 0 to m > 1, the equilibrium exists.
b) If bv < au:
Step 1. In Appendix A.3.3, it is shown that P (F) is strictly increasing for
f0 ≤ F < 1 − f1. Therefore, F (h) that satisfies P (F (h)) = C′(h) is a continuous
distribution on (hmin, hmax).
Step 2: If the distribution of human capital is continuous on (hmin, hmax),
then the job finding probability for workers at hmin is P (0). Firms can rank workers
above and below f0 and P (F) for F ≤ f0 is 0. We have to show that E (hmin) > E (h)
for any h < hmin, keeping the ranking fixed. The expected earnings of the worker at the
minimum of the distribution are E (h) = P (0) h− C (h). Since E ′ (h) = P (0)− C′ (h)
and E ′′ (h) = −C′′ (h) < 0, we see that this condition is satisfied.
Step 3: the same as step 3 in part a.
Step 4. The LHS of P (F (h)) = C′(h) can range from 0 to 1. Since C′(h) is
assumed to be continuous and ranges from 0 to m > 1, the equilibrium exists.
a.3.5 Matching function
The matching process is efficient in the sense that the number of workers employed are
min {U, V}. However, when the individuals choose h, they still do not know u and v,
for this reason, the relevant matching function is:
E [min {U, V}]
Let au = U − k, bu = U + k, av = V − k and bv = V + k. The matching function
will be denoted M
(
U, V
)
, and is a function that depends on the expected number of
workers U, the expected number of vacancies V, and on the parameter k.
76 appendix
Case 1. au < bu ≤ av < bv
In all realizations min {u, v} = U, therefore the expected number of matchings will
be:
M
(
U, V
)
=
∫ bu
au
[∫ bv
av
1
(bv − av)(bu − au)udv
]
du = U
The condition au < bu < av < bv implies U + 2k < V.
Case 2. au < av < bu < bv
The matching function on this range is:
M
(
U, V
)
=
∫ bv
bu
[∫ bu
au
1
(bv − av)(bu − au) udu
]
dv +
∫ av
au
[∫ bu
av
1
(bv − av)(bu − au) udv
]
du
+ 2
∫ bu
av
[∫ v
av
1
(bv − av)(bu − au) udu
]
dv
The first term represents the case when v lies between bu and bv, in this case
min {u, v} = v whatever the realization of U. The second term represents the case
when u lies between au and av, in this case min {u, v} = u whatever the realization
of v (we do not include the cases already accounted in the first term). The third and
fourth term represent the case when u and v lie between av and bu: in the third term
min {u, v} = v and in the fourth min {u, v} = u. This can be simplified to:
M
(
U, V
)
=
−8k3 − 6k (V −U)2 + (V −U)3 + 12k2 (V +U)
24k2
The condition au < av ≤ bu < bv implies U < V ≤ U + 2k.
Case 3. av ≤ au < bv ≤ bu
The matching function on this range is:
M
(
U, V
)
=
∫ bu
bv
[∫ bv
av
1
(bv − av)(bu − au) vdv
]
du +
∫ au
av
[∫ bv
au
1
(bv − av)(bu − au) vdu
]
dv
+ 2
∫ bv
au
[∫ u
au
1
(bv − av)(bu − au) vdv
]
du
This is symmetric to case 2, with the support of V in the position of the support of
U, and vice versa.
M
(
U, V
)
=
−8k3 − 6k (U −V)2 + (U −V)3 + 12k2 (U +V)
24k2
The condition av ≤ au < bv ≤ bu implies U − 2k < V ≤ U.
Case 4. av < bv ≤ au < bu
In all realizations min {u, v} = v, the expected number of matchings will be:
M
(
U, V
)
=
∫ bv
av
[∫ bu
au
1
(bv − av)(bu − au) vdu
]
dv = V
The condition bv ≤ au implies V + k ≤ U − k. Therefore, the support must satisfy
V ≤ U − 2k.
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The matching function that results is:
M
(
U, V
)
=

U for U + 2k < V
−8k3−6k(V−U)2+(V−U)3+12k2(V+U)
24k2 for U < V ≤ U + 2k
−8k3−6k(U−V)2+(U−V)3+12k2(U+V)
24k2 for U − 2k < V ≤ U
V for V ≤ U − 2k
The first derivatives of the matching function are:
∂M
(
U, V
)
∂V
=

0 for U + 2k < V
(2k+U−V)2
8k2 for U < V ≤ U + 2k
4k2+4k(U−V)−(U−V)2
8k2 for U − 2k < V ≤ U
1 for V ≤ U − 2k
∂M
(
U, V
)
∂U
=

1 for U + 2k < V
4k2+4k(V−U)−(V−U)2
8k2 for U < V ≤ U + 2k
(2k−U+V)2
8k2 for U − 2k < V ≤ U
0 for V ≤ U − 2k
Both U and V have the same derivative, so we only need to check one of them,
let’s say
∂M(U,V)
∂U
. And only, when U < V ≤ U + 2k we cannot see directly that the
derivative is positive. It will be so if 4k2 + 4k
(
V −U)− (V −U)2 > 0. On the other
hand, we know that V ≤ U + 2k , which implies that (V −U)2 ≤ (2k)2. Besides, we
know that U < V implies that
(
V −U) > 0. Both conditions prove that the derivative
is positive.
The second derivatives are:
∂2 M
(
U, V
)
∂V2
=

0 for U + 2k < V
− 2k−V+U4k2 for U < V ≤ U + 2k
− 2k−U+V4k2 for U − 2k < V ≤ U
0 for V ≤ U − 2k
∂2 M
(
U, V
)
∂U2
=

0 for U + 2k < V
− 2k+U−V4k2 for U < V ≤ U + 2k
− 2k−U+V4k2 for U − 2k < V ≤ U
0 for V ≤ U − 2k
Again, the second derivatives are equal. Analysing
∂2 M(U,V)
∂U2
, we can check that the
derivative is negative in case 2 and 3 on the dominion defined.
Therefore, M
(
U, V
)
is increasing and concave on both arguments.
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M
(
U, V
)
has increasing returns to scale if M
(
mU, mV
)
> m·M
(
U, V
)
for any
m > 1.
In case 3:
M
(
mU, mV
)−m ∗M (U, V) = (m−1)(8k3−6km(U−V)2+m(1+m)(U−V)3)24k2 = (m−1)J(m)24k2
This is positive if J (m) > 0.
J′′ (m) = 2
(
U −V)3 > 0 in case 3. It is convex.
J (m) has a minimum at m =
6k−(U−V)
2(U−V) for U 6= V
J
(
6k−(U−V)
2(U−V)
)
= 0.25
(
8k− (U −V)) (−2k + (U −V))2
This is positive if 8k− (U −V) > 0. In case 3 U− 2k < V, therefore J ( 6k−(U−V)
2(U−V)
)
>
0 and J (m) > J
(
6k−(U−V)
2(U−V)
)
> 0
If U −V = 0, J (m) = 8k3 > 0 for any m.
Therefore, the matching function has increasing returns to scale in case 3. Similarly,
it also has increasing returns to scale in case 2.
a.3.6 Distribution of human capital
We can summarize the conditions on the distributions of V and U as conditions on θ
for U and k given. For low values of θ, it will be likely that there will be few vacancies,
compared to workers. The support of V will be to the left of the support of U. And as
θ increases, the support of V will move to the right.
We can derive the continuous part of the distribution from the equilibrium condition:
P (F) = C′ (h)
It is possible to invert P (F), for (1−θ)U−2k
U−k < F <
(1−θ)U+2k
U+k
because P (F) is strictly
increasing on this range. This range corresponds to conditions 2, 3 and 4, defined in
Appendix A.3.2.
Condition 2:
P (F) =
− (−4+ 4F + F2) k2 + 2 (2− F) k (θ − (1− F))U − ((θ − (1− F))U)2
8 (1− F) k2 for
(1− θ)U
U − k < F <
(1− θ)U + 2k
U + k
The equation p(F) = C′(h) implies:
A.3 chapter 3 79
F(h) =
(−2+ 4C′ (h)) k2 − k (θ − 3)U + (1− θ)U2(
k +U
)2 − 2
√
2
√
(1− C′ (h)) k2
(
(1− 2C′ (h)) k2 + k (θ − 1)U + θU2
)
(
k +U
)2
for h1 < h < hmax
With hmax defined by P
(
(1−θ)U+2k
U+k
)
= 1 = C′ (hmax)and h1 and satisfies P
(
(1−θ)U
U−k
)
=
C′ (h1).
Condition 3:
P (F) =
k + (θ − (1− F))U
2k
for
(1− θ)U
U + k
< F ≤ (1− θ)U
U − k
The equation p(F) = C′(h) implies:
F(h) =
(2C′ (h)− 1) k +U − θU
U
for h2 < h < h1
With h1 satisfying P
(
(1−θ)U
U−k
)
= C′ (h1) and h2 such that P
(
(1−θ)U
U+k
)
= C′ (h2).
Condition 4:
P (F) =
(
(−2+ F) k + ((1− F)− θ)U)2
8(1− F)k2 for
(1− θ)U − 2k
U − k ≤ F ≤
(1− θ)U
U + k
The equation P(F) = C′(h) implies:
F(h) =
(2− 4C′ (h)) k2 + k (θ − 3)U + (1− θ)U2 + 2√2
√
C′ (h) k2
(
(2C′ (h)− 1) k2 + θU2 + k (1− θ)U
)
(
k−U)2
for hmin < h < h2
With h2 such that P
(
(1−θ)U
U+k
)
= C′ (h2) and hmin satisfying P (0) = C′ (hmin)
As it happened when calculating the probability function, we should consider the 4
cases the economy can take separately.
Case 1: 1+ 2k
U
≤ θ
All the population has a probability of 1 of finding a job and there is an excess of
vacancies, so the wage of each worker equals his level of skills. The expected earnings
of the worker are:
E (h) = h− C(h)
This is maximum when h = hmax. All workers will choose the same level of skills
and hmin = hmax.
Case 2: 1 < θ < 1+ 2k
U
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In this case, only conditions 1 to 3 apply. Thus, the distribution function is continuous
also at the minimum of the support:
F (h) =

1 for hmax
(−2+4C′(h))k2−k(θ−3)U+(1−θ)U2−2√2
√
(1−C′(h))k2
(
(1−2C′(h))k2+k(θ−1)U+θU2
)
(k+U)
2 for h1 < h < hmax
(2C′(h)−1)k+U−θU
U
for hmin ≤ h ≤ h1
The workers at the bottom of the distribution will choose hmin such that P(0) =
C′(hmin). In case 2, P (0) =
k+(θ−1)U
2k .
Case 3: 1− 2k
U
< θ ≤ 1
In this case, only conditions 1- 4 apply. Thus, the distribution function is also
continuous at the minimum of the support.
F (h) =

1 for hmax
(−2+4C′(h))k2−k(θ−3)U+(1−θ)U2−2√2
√
(1−C′(h))k2
(
(1−2C′(h))k2+k(θ−1)U+θU2
)
(k+U)
2 for h1 < h < hmax
(2C′(h)−1)k+U−θU
U
for h2 < h ≤ h1
(2−4C′(h))k2+k(θ−3)U+(1−θ)U2+2√2
√
C′(h)k2
(
(2C′(h)−1)k2+θU2+k(1−θ)U
)
(k−U)2
for hmin ≤ h ≤ h2
The workers at the bottom of the distribution will choose hmin such that P(0) =
C′(hmin). In case 3, P (0) =
(−2k+(1−θ)U)2
8k2 .
Case 4: θ ≤ 1− 2k
U
In this case the 5 conditions apply. The workers with F = F0 satisfy the optimal
condition that P (F) = C′ (h) but P
(
(1−θ)U−2k
U−k
)
= 0. They choose, a level of skills equal
to 0. As the level of skills cannot be negative, this is the minimum of the distribution
of skills, hmin = 0. There is a mass of workers f0 =
(1−θ)U−2k
U−k at the minimum of the
distribution.
Thus, the distribution of h is:
F (h) =

1 for h = hmax
(−2+4C′(h))k2−k(θ−3)U+(1−θ)U2−2√2
√
(1−C′(h))k2
(
(1−2C′(h))k2+k(θ−1)U+θU2
)
(k+U)
2 for h1 < h < hmax
(2C′(h)−1)k+U−θU
U
for h2 < h ≤ h1
(2−4C′(h))k2+k(θ−3)U+(1−θ)U2+2√2
√
C′(h)k2
(
(2C′(h)−1)k2+θU2+k(1−θ)U
)
(k−U)2
for hmin < h ≤ h2
U−θU−2k
U−k for h = hmin = 0
A.3 chapter 3 81
a.3.7 Effect of market size and market tightness
a.3.7.1 Effect of market tightness on the job finding probability
∂p(F)
∂θ
=

0 for (1−θ)U+2k
U+k
< F ≤ 1 [1]
U((2−F)k−(θ−(1−F))U)
4(1−F)k2 for
(1−θ)U
U−k < F ≤
(1−θ)U+2k
U+k
[2]
U
2k for
(1−θ)U
U+k
< F ≤ (1−θ)U
U−k [3]
U((2−F)k+(θ−(1−F))U)
4(1−F)k2 for
(1−θ)U−2k
U−k < F ≤
(1−θ)U
U+k
[4]
0 for 0 ≤ F ≤ (1−θ)U−2k
U−k [5]
Condition 2 states F ≤ (1−θ)U+2k
U+k
, which implies (2− F) k − (θ − (1− F))U ≥ 0.
Therefore, the derivative associated to condition 2 is positive. Condition 4 states
(1−θ)U−2k
U−k < F, which implies (2− F) k+ (θ − (1− F))U > 0. Therefore, the derivative
associated to condition 4 is positive. ∂p(F)∂θ > 0.
a.3.7.2 Effect of market size on the job finding probability
The derivative of the hiring probability with respect to U is:
∂p(F)
∂U
=

0 for (1−θ)U+2k
U+k
< F ≤ 1 [1]
(θ − (1− F)) (2−F)k−(θ−(1−F))U4(1−F)k2 for
(1−θ)U
U−k < F ≤
(1−θ)U+2k
U+k
[2]
θ−(1−F)
2k for
(1−θ)U
U+k
< F ≤ (1−θ)U
U−k [3]
(θ − (1− F)) ((2−F)k+(θ−(1−F))U)4(1−F)k2 for
(1−θ)U−2k
U−k < F ≤
(1−θ)U
U+k
[4]
0 for 0 ≤ F ≤ (1−θ)U−2k
U−k [5]
Condition 2 states (1−θ)U
U−k < F, which implies θ − (1 − F) > FkU , which means
(θ − (1− F)) > 0. On the other hand, F ≤ (1−θ)U+2kU+k implies (2− F) k− (θ − (1− F))U ≥
0. Therefore, the derivative associated to condition 2 is positive. The derivative as-
sociated to condition 3 is positive for F > 1− θ, negative for F < 1− θ and zero for
F = 1− θ. Condition 4 states F ≤ (1−θ)U
U+k
, which implies (θ − (1− F)) ≤ − FKU < 0. On
the other hand, (1−θ)U−2k
U−k < F implies (2− F) k + (θ − (1− F))U > 0. Therefore, the
derivative associated to condition 4 is negative.
a.3.7.3 Effect of market tightness on the distributions
F (h) satisfies P (F (h)) = C′(h). As ∂P(F)∂θ > 0 for any h < hmax but the RHS is constant
with market tightness, F (h) must be lower. For the case of hmin, it is easy to check that
also in case 4, f0 = U−θU−2kU−k , which is decreasing in θ until it reaches its minimum 0.
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a.3.7.4 Effect of market size on the distribution
Part a:
F (h) satisfies P (F (h)) = C′(h). As ∂P(F)
∂U
> 0 for any 1− θ < F < 1 but the RHS is
constant with market tightness, F (h) must be lower for this range of F (h). If F < 1− θ,
we will have that ∂P(F)
∂U
< 0, so F (h) must increase. If h = h0,
∂P(F)
∂U
= 0, so F (h0) is
constant in U.
Part b:
If θ < 1, the economy is either in case 3, θ ≥ 1− 2k
U
, or in case 4, θ < 1− 2k
U
. For U
large enough it will shift from case 3 to 4. In case 3, f0 = 0. In case 4, f0 = U−θU−2kU−k
which is increasing in U, ∂ f0
∂U
= (1+θ)k
(U−k)2
> 0. If θ ≥ 1, f0 = 0, as we show in Proposition
1.
Part c:
f1 = θU−kU+k if f1 < 1, which is increasing in U,
∂ f1
∂U
= (1+θ)k
(U+k)
2 > 0.
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